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Beyond Weber. The Broadening Scope of
Judicial Approval of Affirmative Action
Kenneth R. Kreiling*
Thomas D. Mercurio**
I.

Introduction

The question whether an employer may hire a specific percentage of employees because of their race without running afoul of the
antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 has been heavily debated. Those who oppose voluntary affirmative action cite several reasons: the language of Title VII on its face
prohibits all racial discrimination; legislative history reinforces the
plain language of the statute; an amendment to the Civil Rights Act
states that employers are not required to hire minorities in proportion to their representation in the population; and McDonald v.
Sante Fe TransportationCo.' establishes that Title VII clearly prohibits treating blacks more favorably than whites. Proponents of
preferential hiring argue that executive, administrative, and judicial
developments place the employer in an impossible position unless Title VII is interpreted to allow employers to engage in affirmative action. For example, employers who are federal contractors face loss of
lucrative federal contracts unless they engage in affirmative action.
Other employers may be subject to lawsuits brought by minorities or
the government if a racial imbalance exists in that employer's work
force.
The debate moved into the general area of remedies for discrimination and into ethical issues stemming from affirmative action, and
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. B.A. 1963, Marquette University; J.D. 1966,
M.A. 1967, University of Wisconsin; LL.M. 1976, Harvard Law School.
00 Instructor, Vermont Law School. B.A. 1972, University of Virginia; J.D. 1981, Boston College Law School.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to Charles O'Brien and Jane Woodruff for
their extensive research assistance and to Charles Sullivan for his helpful comments.
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-! to -17 (1976 and Supp. V 1981).
2. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).

the following questions were raised: whether preferential hiring is
proper without judicial, or at least governmental, findings of past
discrimination; whether people who are not identified victims of discrimination could be remedial beneficiaries of affirmative action
without unfairly affecting incumbent employees; whether employers

can competently balance the proper considerations in implementing
affirmative action programs; and whether benign racial preferences
are morally permissible.
In United Steelworkers of America v. Weber,3 the United
States Supreme Court decided that "voluntary" affirmative action at
the hiring level is permissible in at least some situations. Weber was
decided largely within the confines of Title VII's language and the
congressional debate on Title VII. Rather than formulating a rule
addressing when preferential treatment was permissible, however,
the Court merely pointed to characteristics of the particular private
plan in question that made it reasonable in light of past discrimination against craftworkers. 4 Thus, Weber resolved few issues and provided little guidance for the lower courts.
This article discusses the pre-Weber developments necessary to
understand the pressures for affirmative action, the Weber opinion,
and the difficult issues faced by the lower courts in private employer
cases after Weber. Specifically, this article explores the requisite basis for preferential hiring, the types of plans that may be acceptable
under Title VII, the nexus that must exist between basis and plan,
and whether summary judgment is available for the employer-defendant in a reverse discrimination case. The article then considers
whether the approach that has developed in private employer hiring
cases is adequate in analyzing public sector cases or cases involving
affirmative action in layoff situations.
II.

Background: Important Pre-Weber Developments

To understand how lower courts should deal with post-Weber
reverse discrimination claims, and to appreciate the difficulties facing employers in this area, one must recognize the pressures on employers to engage in "voluntary" affirmative action. The first section
of this article traces the development of the disparate impact the3. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
4. It should be noted that this past discrimination occurred, not necessarily on the part
of the employer in Weber, but rather on the part of the craft work force generally. Although
the number of blacks in the craft work force was disproportionate to the number of blacks in
the general work force, and the Kaiser work force consequently reflected this disproportion, the
Court did not demand proof that Kaiser had actually discriminated against blacks in its hiring
policies. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text discussing Justice Blackmun's position
that the Court should demand a showing at least of an "arguable violation" of Title VII.

ory 5, the major judicial impetus for affirmative action, and then examines additional pressures in favor of affirmative action as provided
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and
the federal contract program.
When Congress considered and enacted Title VII, it was concerned with removing race and other irrelevant characteristics from

employment decisions." Several years later, it became apparent that
color-blind employee selection mechanisms could nevertheless result
in significant disadvantages to minority applicants.' Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.8 confronted the Supreme Court with such a situation. In
Griggs, blacks challenged the company's use of a standardized test
and a high school graduation requirement as job selection criteria.
Although facially neutral, these job requirements effectively barred
blacks from the more desirable jobs. General population data indicated that black males completed high school only one-third as frequently as whites, and data obtained from another employer who
used a similar battery of standardized tests showed a white pass ra-

tio nine times as great as the black ratio. The Court therefore found
that the use of the tests had a disparate impact on blacks and so
violated Title VII. Intent of the employer is irrelevant because "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employ-

ment practices, not simply to motivation."'
Despite Title VII protection for the use of standardized tests in
hiring or promoting,"0 the Griggs Court prohibited their use if a dis5. "Disparate treatment" discrimination is "the purposeful exclusion of minorities or
women from jobs" while disparate impact "arises when employment policies, regardless of
intent, weigh more heavily on one group than another." M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

123 (1982).

The Supreme Court has described disparate impact theory as follows:
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress "disparate
impact." The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required
under a disparate-impact theory.
InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
6. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COm. L. REV. 431 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Vaas]; Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
235 (1971); Meltzer, The Weber Case: Judicial Abrogation of the Antidiscrimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Meltzer].
7. See, e.g., cases cited in Meltzer, supra note 6, at 425 n.12.
8. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
9. Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). See section 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), which
authorizes an employer's use of professionally developed ability tests that are "not designed,
intended, or used to discriminate." The author of a contemporary account of the legislative
history of Title VIi nevertheless suggests that the question remains open whether practices
resulting in "de facto discrimination" of which the user knows or should have known violate
Title VII. Vaas, supra note 6, at 449 (emphasis in original). The Court focused on "used." 401
U.S. 424 (1971).
10. The facts showed, however, that when the employer in 1965 ostensibly opened the
better jobs to blacks while simultaneously imposing the test and diploma requirements, it also
permitted incumbent white employees to keep their jobs without meeting these requirements.

criminatory impact on a minority group results and the employer
cannot show business necessity for using the criteria. The Court established a two-step analysis. First, once a selection criterion is
shown to have a discriminatory effect on a protected minority, a
claim can be made against an employer even without a showing of
intent to discriminate." Second, upon a showing of such disparate
impact, the employer must demonstrate a business necessity for using the test, or, "that any given requirement must have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question." 1' The Court described
the relationship between professionally developed tests and Title VII
protection as follows: "The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited."' 8
The Court endorsed the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing
Procedures, which required job relatedness and expressed a strong if
14
not absolute presumption in favor of empirical test validation.
Four years later, in Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody,' 5 the
Court was faced with an employer who had been using a general
ability test to predict job performance. The test, which had a discriminatory impact on blacks, had never been validated by the employer. Upon the eve of trial, the employer conducted its own haphazard validation of the test in question." The Court first noted
that, because the jobs in question were relatively skilled positions
and presumably could not be performed by simply anyone, the employer's use of an ability test had at least some claim to "facial validity.' 117 The Court, however, again looked to the EEOC Guidelines
and its approval of them in Griggs, and stated:
These Guidelines draw upon and make reference to professional
The evidence showed that these incumbents performed the job well despite some employees' lack of a high school diploma. Therefore, the employer could not maintain that the tests
were related to the essence of the job in question.
i.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
12. Id. at 432. Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status quo
of prior discrimination. Id. at 429-30.
13. Id. at 431.
14. Id. at 433-34.
15. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).

16. "It cannot escape notice that Albemarle's study was conducted by plant officials,
without neutral, on-the-scene oversight, at a time when this litigation was about to come to
trial. Studies so closely controlled by an interested party in litigation must be examined with
great care." Id. at 433 n.32.
17. While there was at least some claim to facial validity in Albemarle because of the
"relatively skilled" nature of the positions in question, Albemarle also involved previously segregated positions, not-very-carefully chosen tests, and an apparent concession of discriminatory
effect. For the suggestion that the Court was correct in Griggs, but failed to distinguish the
different factual pattern in subsequent cases like Albemarle, see Lerner, Washington v. Davis:
Quantity, Quality, and Equality in Employment Testing, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 263, 270
(1977); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 431.

standards of test validation established by the American Psychological Association . . . . [T]hey are "entitled to great
deference."
The message of these guidelines is the same as that of the
Griggs case-that discriminatory tests are impermissible unless
shown, by professionally acceptable methods, to be "predictive
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work
behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for
which candidates are being evaluated." 1 s
Because of the fundamental flaws in Albemarle's test validation, the
Court held that Albemarle had not proved the job-relatedness of its
testing program.
Griggs and Albemarle did not establish how great a discriminatory impact was required to trigger the employer's duty to validate
its testing procedures. These and subsequent cases used several different standards interchangeably.1 9 Furthermore, these cases did not
determine which statistics are probative of disparate impact.20 Justice Blackmun, while concurring in the result in Albemarle, foresaw
the result of the easy prima facie case resulting from slavish adherence to the EEOC Guidelines:
I cannot join, however, in the Court's apparent view that absolute compliance with the EEOC Guidelines is a sine qua non of
pre-employment test validation. . . .Nor are the theories on
which the guidelines are based beyond dispute. The simple truth
is that pre-employment tests, like most attempts to predict the
future, will never be completely accurate. We should bear in
mind that pre-employment testing, so long as it is fairly related
to the job skills or work characteristics desired, possesses the potential of being an effective weapon in protecting equal employment opportunity because it has a unique capacity to measure
all applicants objectively on a standardized basis. I fear that a
too rigid application of the EEOC Guidelines will leave the employer little choice, save an impossibly expensive and complex
18. 422 U.S. at 431 (footnote and citations omitted). The Court, however, apparently
rejected the EEOC's requirement that the employer demonstrate the absence of less discriminatory alternatives and placed the burden of demonstrating the alternatives on the plaintiff.
422 U.S. at 425. Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1982).
19. The Court used different terms interchangeably between 1971 and 1977. Among the
terms were "policies or tests which demonstrate" or result in a "racial pattern significantly
different," Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425; "disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate,"
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426; "fall more harshly on one group than another," International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977); or "disproportionately exclude
women," Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
20. "The Courts have not clearly defined what constitutes substantial 'adverse effect.'
Until Congress or the Courts provide a clear standard to determine when differences are of a
sufficient magnitude to require the employer to prove that his selection procedure is job-related, the law will continue to develop on a case-by-case basis with often unpredictable results." B. SCHLEI AND P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 73-74 (1st ed.
1976).

validation study, but to engage in a subjective quota system of
employment selection. This, of course, is far from the intent of
Title VII.2L
Confronted with the Supreme Court's apparently undemanding
standard for establishing a prima facie case, the uncritical use of
statistics, the willingness to assume a fungible population 22 presumably qualified for many positions, and the blessing conferred on the
EEOC Guidelines' strong preference for empirical validation, the
lower courts through the mid-1970s struck down most challenged
job-selection devices.2 8 Employers, uncertain about what constitutes
disparate impact, simply could not ascertain whether they were legally culpable. Further, plaintiffs could easily make out a prima facie case. To defend its use of pre-employment testing, the employerdefendant then had to come forward with costly or unavailable evidence to justify its employment selection device or meet the demanding standard of job relatedness. Thus, as Justice Blackmun predicted, an employer faced tremendous pressure to abandon even
nonracially motivated attempts to hire on a meritocratic basis in
favor of proportional hiring or affirmative action.
While the EEOC's validation requirements can be viewed as a
stick prodding the employer toward affirmative action, the EEOC
has also dangled a carrot in front of the employer. Until 1978, the
EEOC Guidelines required validation of any test shown to adversely
affect job opportunities for a protected group.2 In 1978, the EEOC,
along with agencies that enforce the equal opportunity statutes and
executive orders, adopted the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures.25 Rather than focus on a particular test or other
single component of the employer's decision-making process, the
Uniform Guidelines measure adverse impact by the total selection
process, or "bottom line."2 Unless the overall selection rate for minorities is less than eighty percent of that group with the highest
selection rate (the four-fifths rule), the agencies "in the usual circumstances" will not expect the employer to validate a scrutinized
component."'
21. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
22. For example, in Weber, the "underutilization" of blacks in the employer's craft work
force was based on a presumed availability of blacks in the general labor market qualified as
skilled craftsmen.
23. Note, Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 28 CATHOLIC U.L.
REV.605, 616 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Uniform Guidelines]. A few courts, however,
proved more sophisticated and took a more balanced approach to the Guidelines. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'r of the City of New York, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1982).
25. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,195 (1978).
26. See Note,Uniform Guidelines, supra note 23 at 620.
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C) (1982). The Guidelines note two situations in which an employer must demonstrate job-relatedness of the component:

The bottom-line concept is not offered as a binding interpretation of Title VII, but as a rule of prosecutorial discretion." Nonetheless, the courts have frequently looked to the Uniform Guidelines in
cases brought by private plaintiffs challenging individual components
of the selection process. 9 Although the recent Supreme Court case
Connecticut v. Teals° has largely discredited the bottom-line approach, enforcement agencies and courts applying the bottom line
have supplied considerable additional incentive to focus on results.
The EEOC Guidelines on Affirmative Action,31 adopted between the Fifth Circuit decision striking down the affirmative action
plan in Weber and the Supreme Court decision upholding it, come
out clearly in favor of explicit race-conscious hiring. The Guidelines
provide that the EEOC will not press a claim of reverse discrimination occurring in the context of an affirmative action plan that complies with the Guidelines. Furthermore, the Guidelines create a defense to a reverse discrimination claim for plans that meet their
criteria, 8 thereby increasing the incentive to engage in explicit raceconscious
minority hiring."a
In addition to the EEOC pressures and disparate impact developments, executive orders that prohibit discrimination by federal
contractors provide another significant impetus for employers to engage in affirmative action. Particularly, Executive Order 11,246" 4
(1) where the selection procedure is a significant factor in the continuation of
patterns of assignments of incumbent employees caused by prior discriminatory
employment practices, [and]
(2) where the weight of court decisions or administrative interpretations hold
[sic] that a specific procedure (such as height or weight requirements or noarrest records) is not job related in the same or similar circumstances.
Id.
28. See Note, Uniform Guidelines, supra note 23, at 620 n.12.
29. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 96 (2d ed.
1983).
30. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). In Teal, black employees who failed a threshold written examination were excluded from further consideration for promotions. Although the exam impacted
disproportionately on blacks, the number of blacks ultimately promoted was proportionately
far higher than the number of whites promoted. Thus, at the bottom line, blacks as a group
were not injured. The Supreme Court ruled that the disappointed black employees had made a
prima facie case of unlawful discrimination and the employer would have to demonstrate the
exam's relation to the job.
Justice Brennan's majority opinion is unclear whether the holding is a narrow one or the
entire bottom-line concept is suspect. An illustration of Teal's potential for confusion is Costa
v. Markey, 706 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1983), in which the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
itself twice on successive rehearings in Teal's aftermath.
31. 29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1982).
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.10 (1982).
33. Of course, upon suit by a private plaintiff, a court is not bound to follow the EEOC
Guidelines. Thus, just as the Teal Court refused to apply a bottom-line analysis, a court may
decline to extend an EEOC Guideline-created defense to a claim of reverse discrimination.
34. A series of executive orders were promulgated starting in the war years and culminating in 1967 with numbers 11,246 (race, color, creed, and national origin) and 11,375 (sex).
See Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 225 (1971).

imposes a duty of nondiscrimination on federal contractors

5

and a

duty "to take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are em-

ployed and that employees are treated during the employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin."' 6 The order
does not define "affirmative action." Initially, the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance in the Department of Labor (OFCC), which

administered the order, did not require preference for protected minorities. 7 Regulations passed in 1970, however, required affirmative
action with racial goals in situations in which protected classes were
being "underutilized." 3 Thus, pressure for the employer to become
results-oriented developed because, in the absence of a racially balanced work force, significant-sized employers 9 could be denied lucrative federal contracts.4
An example.of the effect of pressure toward affirmative action is
found in the Weber case. 4 ' Kaiser Aluminum was under heavy pres-

sure from the government because of its underutilization of minority
craftworkers before adopting the plan attacked by Brian Weber. To
avoid costly administrative wrangling and possible loss of lucrative
contracts, employers will gravitate toward affirmative action to en-

sure appropriate utilization of minorities.
This discussion should not be interpreted to mean that all judi35. The order covers all contractors ifthe aggregate value of the contract is $10,000 and
imposes model clauses on all contractors and subcontractors. The Reagan administration has
proposed higher threshold requirements. See 112 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 243 (March 28,
1983). At the time of writing, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) had submitted the proposed regulations to the EEOC and the Office of Management and Budget for
comment. However, as the proposals have received extensive comments for over a year, it is
unlikely they will be significantly altered. See Equal Employment Compliance Update 79
(April 1983).
36. Exec. Order 11,246, § 202(1).
37. See Meltzer, supra note 6, at 435.
38. Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 to .14 (1982). For additional requirements see § 60-2.13 and § 60-2.20 to .225. For an incisive treatment of the affirmative action
requirements of the executive orders, which also cover handicapped, disabled and Vietnam era

veterans, and religious discrimination, see A.

SMITH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW,

1023-33 (1978). See supra note 35.
39. The Order covers contractors with federal contracts in excess of $10,000. The affirmative action plan must be in writing ifthe value of the federal contract exceeds $50,000.
41 C.F.R. § 60-2.1 (1982). But see supra note 35.
40. One critic of the result-oriented approach explains as follows:
An employer's compliance as a practical matter was to be ascertained by comparing the representation of minorities in his work force with their representation in some population or labor market. The agencies responsible for compliance pressed contractors for goals and timetables or "commitments" to increase
minority employment, even though there had been no showing of past or present
discrimination by the contractors. Despite the pressure for racially oriented decisions exerted by these ill-defined extra-statutory requirements, the regulations
contained the usual contrapuntal disclaimer: The use of goals and timetables "is
not intended. . .to discriminate against any applicant or employees because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin." Despite this disclaimer, a former
Under Secretary of Labor later conceded that "goals" were ill-disguised quotas.
Meltzer, supra note 6,at 435-36.
41. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

cial and agency developments point unequivocally to the Weber result. It does demonstrate, however, the substantial pressure generated in the 1970s for the Weber result. While the Supreme Court,
beginning in 1976, at times indicated dissatisfaction with its approach, it continued to cite the earlier precedents. 42 The Court distinguished or ignored the implications of those precedents without
explicitly cutting back on the breadth of their doctrine. 48 However,
substantial doctrinal and administrative pressures coalesced with social pressures to push the employer toward affirmative action as the
path of least resistance. This theme was reflected in Weber by a dissenting opinion in the Fifth Circuit and a concurring opinion in the
Supreme Court which suggest that the logic of antidiscrimination

developments during the 1970s compelled the Weber result."
III.

The Weber Case

Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum Company45 is the only case in
which the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed the legality of affirmative action in the employment discrimination context. Kaiser
required prior experience for craft positions and had been unable to
hire blacks because of the limited number of blacks with such experience. Kaiser and United Steelworkers agreed to eliminate the great
imbalance between the percentage of black craftworkers at Kaiser
42. Briefly, the back-pedaling appears to have begun in 1976 with Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), a constitutional challenge to a District of Columbia Police Department
qualifying exam. The Court held that the disparate impact standard did not apply to a constitutional challenge and that the affirmative efforts to recruit blacks negated any inference of
intentional discrimination. The Court went on to observe that it is apparent that some minimal
verbal and communication skill was useful, if not essential, to the training program and that
"a positive relationship between the test and training-course performance was sufficient to validate the former, wholly aside from its possible relationship to actual performance as a police
officer." Id. at 250.
In Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court apparently indicated
that the disparate impact approach was not applicable to certain employment practices like the
use of a rule which allowed the superintendent to hire "only persons he knew to be experienced
and competent in this type of work or persons who had been recommended to him as similarly
skilled." Id. at 570.
In Beazer v. New York Transit Auth., 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the Court rejected statistics
which might not have accurately reflected the racial composition of employees suspected of
using methadone and city-wide statistics which might not have accurately reflected the potential applicant pool, a far cry from the unquestioning resort to dubiously probative statistics in
the earlier cases discussed in the text.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the Court accepted general population
statistics and found that minimum height and weight requirements discriminated against
women. The victory was pyrrhic, however, because the Court upheld a rule prohibiting the
women from being assigned to maximum security institutions.
These cases, especially in conjunction with the disparate treatment cases involving use of
statistics, seem implicitly to make the plaintiff's prima facie case more difficult. They appear
to loosen the defendant's burden in justifying a discriminatory practice.
43. See id.
44. 563 F.2d 216, 227-39 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting); 443 U.S. 193, 20916 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
45. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).

plants and the percentage of blacks in the local labor forces through
affirmative action in a crafts training program for incumbent employees. Under the plan, Kaiser set craftworker goals for each plant
equal to the percentage of blacks in the local labor force and established on-the-job training programs to teach its unskilled production
work staff the skills necessary to become craftworkers. Selection for
training was based on seniority, but Kaiser reserved fifty percent of
the openings in the training programs for blacks until the percentage
of black craftpersons approximated the percentage of blacks in the
local labor force. Brian Weber, a white worker with more seniority
than blacks who were accepted for the training program, was rejected for admission and brought a Title VII action.
47
The district court 4" and a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit
held that the race-based preference violated the anti-discrimination
provisions of Title VII, sections 703(a) and (d).48 The district court
held that a quota system could be imposed (1) only by the judiciary, 49 and (2) only if the employer had discriminated against a
group protected by Title VII and the quota preferred victims of past
discrimination.6 0 The court of appeals disagreed over whether an employer could engage in affirmative action but affirmed because there
was no evidence of past discrimination by the employer.5 1 In his dissent, Judge Wisdom noted that the majority opinion would result in
an end to voluntary compliance with Title VII:
The employer and the union are made to walk a high tightrope
without a net beneath them. On one side lies the possibility of
liability to minorities in private actions, federal pattern and
practice suits, and sanctions under Executive Order 11246. On
the other side is the threat of private suits by white employees
and, potentially, federal action. If the privately imposed remedy
is either excessive or inadequate, the defendants are liable.
• . •Under either alternative, our dockets would be filled with
more Title VII suits, the Congressional emphasis on voluntary
conciliation would be frustrated, and the elimination of the
blight of racial discrimination would be still further delayed.
• . .If an affirmative action plan, adopted in a collective bargaining agreement, is a reasonable remedy for an arguable violation of Title VII, it should be upheld.5"
The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the Kaiser plan by a 546.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976).
563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d).
415 F. Supp. at 767-68.
Id. at 768.
563 F.2d at 224.
Id. at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).

2 vote.' 3 In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan declined to adopt
Judge Wisdom's pragmatic approach. Rather, he focused on the
spirit of Title VII and the language of one provision, which he interpreted to impliedly permit voluntary affirmative action. 5'4 Regarding
the spirit or general purpose of Title VII, Justice Brennan focused on
legislative history to conclude that Congress intended to improve the
economic plight of blacks and promote voluntary efforts to alleviate
discrimination." This intent renders inappropriate a literal interpretation of Title VII to make any and all discrimination based on race
unlawful. Justice Brennan found support for this view in section
703(j), which states that Title VII shall not be interpreted to require
granting preferential treatment to any group to cure a racial imbalance between minority employees and minority representation in the
local workforce.' 6 Congress must have chosen the word "required" in
section 703(j)'s admonition in order not to forbid all voluntary raceconscious affirmative action. Otherwise, section 703(j) would have
stated that voluntary affirmative action is not "required or
17
permitted.
Justice Brennan's holding was ostensibly cautious, simply stating that sections 703(a) and (d) "do not condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans."" He declined to "detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible
affirmative action plans"" but pointed to several characteristics that
made the Kaiser plan acceptable and that might limit the scope of
the opinion: (1) the plan was "voluntarily" undertaken; (2) it was
designed to "eliminate conspicuous racial balance in traditionally
segregated job categories;" (3) it did not "unnecessarily trammel"
the interests of white employees; (4) it did not create an absolute bar
to the advancement of whites; and (5) it was only a temporary measure to eliminate a manifest imbalance. 60 Justice Brennan did not
mention that the program was the result of a collective bargaining
agreement. The Brennan formulation does not require that the employer be culpable, or even arguably culpable, since societal discrimination or pre-Act discrimination can be remedied consistently with
the purposes of the Act through affirmative action.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion adopted the "arguable
violation" approach advocated by Judge Wisdom's dissent in the
53. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
54. Id. at 205.
55.

Id. at 203.

56. Id. at 205.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 208.

59. Id.
60. Id.

court of appeals." He found greater consistency between that approach, which would permit the employer to engage in affirmative
action in the face of an arguable Title VII violation, and the earlier
cases and the legislative compromise by which Congress adopted sec62
tion 703 0).
Under Justice Blackmun's approach, the employer could undertake affirmative action without admitting liability if some evidence
showed that Title VII had been violated. The emphasis is on "arguable," not "violation," because proving an actual violation in a reverse
discrimination suit usually serves neither the employer's nor the
plaintiff's interest: the employer does not want to admit Title VII
liability and facilitate possible suits by protected minorities, and the
reverse discriminatee does not want to make the employer's resort to
affirmative action appear reasonable." The affected minorities, however, may intervene to protect the plan.
Justice Brennan's broad rationale serves Justice Blackmun's objective of extricating the employer from his dilemma much better
than Justice Blackmun's own theory. Although Justice Brennan's approach leaves several important questions unanswered,64 his opinion
stands as the determinant of the legality of voluntary affirmative action plans. Since Weber, employers have been able to engage in affirmative action with relative immunity as a consequence of his
broad rationale."
In stark contrast to Justice Brennan's reading of the spirit of
Title VII, Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent66 that the majority
ignored both the plain meaning of the statute and the language of its
previous cases, especially McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Company. 7 While Justice Rehnquist was correct in many of his
highly critical observations about Justice Brennan's misuse of legislative history, his analysis is prone to the same selective use of legislative history. Actually, the legislative history is of negligible help in
resolving the issue because Congress never focused on the problem of
voluntary affirmative action.66 Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist re61. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 213-14.
64. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 72-345 and accompanying text.
66. 443 U.S. at 219-55 (Pehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
68. The legislative history cited by both sides consists largely of discussions before key
amendments were accepted and individual remarks on the floor rather than more authoritative

committee reports. The author of an article on the legislative history of Title VII has commented generally on the not-very-helpful nature of the legislative history of this important
piece of legislation. See Vaas, supra note 6, at 457-58. More specifically, Dean Schatzki has
bemoaned the heavy resort to the much less than conclusive legislative history by both Justices
Brennan and Rehnquist. Schatzki, An Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L.

ferred to language from previous Supreme Court cases that seems to
indicate a finding by the Court that Congress intended Title VII to
protect whites on the same basis as blacks. However one such case,
Santa Fe,69 explicitly reserved the question of the legality of reverse
discrimination taken pursuant to an affirmative action plan. Another
case cited by Justice Rehnquist, Griggs,7 ° was primarily concerned

with expanding Title VII protection to prohibit facially neutral employment practices that exclude Negroes. Thus, the Court had never
addressed the affirmative action issue, which, as Justice Blackmun

indicated, 7 ' created to a large extent the pressure that led to the
Weber result.
IV.

Questions Remaining after Weber

Aside from the question whether the Court correctly decided
the narrow issue Justice Brennan articulated in Weber," the opinion
raises a number of difficult questions that pose serious problems for
employers and the courts. These problems largely result from three
characteristics of the opinion. First, the rationale is broad even
though the holding purports to address a narrow question.7" Second,

despite the broad rationale and resort to societal discrimination as a
justification for private affirmative action, the Court suggested several limitations7 4 that sound very much like the equitable considerations used by courts to order quota relief after a finding of employer
discrimination. The meaning of these limits is unclear, but they are,

when subject to scrutiny, probably more evanescent than real.75 Finally, the narrow holding raises questions about how broadly the imprimatur should be applied to affirmative action plans in contexts
beyond "voluntary" private affirmative action plans favoring minorities challenged under Title VII.
REV. 51,
69.
70.
71.
72.

66-67 (1980).
McDonald V. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
443 U.S. 193 (1979). There are a number of commentaries on the Weber decision

that are polemical condemnations. See, e.g., Lerner, Employment DiscriminationAdverse Impact, Validity and Equality, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 17, 45; Walker, The Exorbitant Cost of
RedistributingJustice, 21 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1979). Others are highly favorable. See, e.g., Belton, Discriminationand Affirmative Action, 59 N.C.L. REV. 531 (1981); Schatzki, An Exercise in Understandable Indecision, 56 WASH. L. REV. 51 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Schatzki]; Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment After Weber, 34 RUTGE'ts L. REV.

1 (1981). A critical but particularly helpful article is Meltzer, supra note 6. See also Boyd,
Affirmative Action in Employment. The Weber Decision, 66 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1980).

73. One commentator has termed this characteristic of the Weber result as a "fundamental schizophrenia." Schatzki, supra note 72 at 68.
74. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
75. See Meltzer, supra note 6, at 459. A cynical explanation for the narrow holding and
ephemeral limits is that Justice Brennan was able to curry votes from his less liberal brethren
without any substantial concession to them.

Although several courts have uncritically approved affirmative
action plans by largely parroting the observations of Justice Brennan
about the Kaiser plan,71 other courts have attempted to go beyond
Weber's "permissible side of the line" approach and articulate standards generally applicable to affirmative action plans." A discussion
of the problems and how they have been solved by the recent cases
can best be facilitated by examining a series of issues remaining after Weber: what basis must exist for a permissible affirmative action
plan? Assuming an adequate basis, what type of plan is acceptable
and what nexus, if any, must exist between the plan and the challenged action? Under what circumstances, if any, is summary judgment for the employer appropriate in challenges to affirmative action? In what situations does the Weber defense apply? Is the Weber
policy favoring affirmative action plans applicable to section 1981
actions, challenges to public sector affirmative action plans, or seniority overrides in layoff plans devised to preserve affirmative action
gains?
A.

The Basis for the Plan

Two of Justice Brennan's limits on the Weber holding concerned
the basis of Kaiser's affirmative action plan. Specifically, the plan
was voluntary, and it had been implemented in response to a "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
7' 8
categories.
The term "voluntary" should be given a very broad meaning. As
Justice Rehnquist and the two lower courts pointed out, Kaiser Aluminum was under considerable pressure from the federal government
to hire more black craftworkers. 79 Justice Blackmun similarly noted

the great pressure on most employers to resort to affirmative action.80 Also, the Weber Court's emphasis on congressional concern
about employer discretion and voluntary compliance suggests a
broad interpretation of voluntariness. Consistent with Weber, the
threat of litigation should not preclude a finding of voluntariness.
Settlement is often prompted by threat of litigation.8 1 If the employer can engage in affirmative action in the absence of apparent

culpability, an even greater justification exists for such action after a
76. La Riviere v. EEOC, 682 F.2d 1225 (9th Cir. 1982); Hunter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1981).
77. See, e.g., Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981).
78. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
79. Id. at 246 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 210 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81. For a discussion of "voluntariness as settlement," see P. Cox, The Question of "Voluntary" Racial Employment Quotas and Some Thoughts on Judicial Role, 23 ARIz. L.Ruv.
87, 139 (1981).

formal complaint. In short, the facts and logic of Weber along with
common sense suggest that "voluntariness" should not serve as a significant limitation on affirmative action plans.8s
A liberal approach also seems appropriate with respect to the
limitation that the goal of the plan must be to eliminate conspicuous
racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. 83 The requirement of conspicuousness will seemingly always be satisfied
when an occupation is traditionally segregated. Justice Brennan
probably resorted to this language to demonstrate that Kaiser's decision to implement affirmative action was not arbitrary.84 He rejected
the trial court's insistence on a finding of discrimination by the employer to justify affirmative action and further suggested that the
plan need not be motivated by fear of liability under Title VII.8 5
Weber's broad rationale, that Congress did not intend to preclude voluntary action by employers, suggests that reasonable employer efforts should be upheld even in the absence of traditional
discrimination. Certainly, Congress anticipated that Title VII would
apply to newer job areas like the computer industry. Having recognized the economic and social impact of job discrimination, Congress
could not have sensibly or fairly limited voluntary compliance to old
patterns of discrimination. Thus, Justice Brennan intended to
broaden permissible approaches to affirmative action, and his language should not be read as a limitation. The sensible approach to
this aspect of Weber is to allow employers to respond to significant
societal discrimination without particular findings of discrimination
on their part.
The courts have been flexible in not requiring a demonstration
of a traditionally segregated job category. In probably the most systematic discussion of the employer's burden in justifying an affirmative action plan, Setser v. Novack Investment Co.,86 the Court of
82. For an indication of one court's willingness to dismiss the "voluntariness" aspect, see
Tangren v. Wackenhut, 658 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1981). While one could include a discussion of the Weber agreement as the result of collective bargaining, as the Ninth Circuit indicated in Wackenhut, that feature should not limit Weber. See Meltzer, supra note 6. As
Weber and Wackenhut indicate, union protection of majority interests is unlikely when there is
substantial pressure on the employer.
83. Justice Brennan did not define what he meant by this term. He referred to both the
long exclusion of blacks from craft unions, of which judicial findings are so numerous as to
make judicial notice proper, and Kaiser's conspicuous underutilization of blacks (1.8% skilled
workers in a labor force 39% black). 443 U.S. at 198 n.l. See also id. at 212 (Justice Blackmun's proffered definition .of "traditionally segregated").
84. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, Justice Brennan's approach is expansive when
measured against the arguable violation theory. 443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan approached the problem in terms of statistical disparity between the population and the employer's work force, although he did refer to the pervasive discrimination by
craft unions. See supra note 83.
85. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208 n.8.
86. 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981).

Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set forth criteria for evaluating an
affirmative action defense. A white truck driver claimed under section 1981 s" that he was denied a more lucrative over-the-road job
when the employer instead hired blacks pursuant to an affirmative

action plan. Applying Weber to the section 1981 claim, the court
held that the employer's first burden "is to produce some evidence
that its affirmative action program was a response to a conspicuous
racial imbalance in its work force and is remedial,""6 to ensure that
the employer is not merely engaged in impermissible pro-minority
discrimination. Such evidence might include workforce statistics,
prior judicial findings of racial imbalance, or results of the employer's own self-study. 89 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Lehman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc.,"9 focused clearly

on the remedial nature of affirmative action. 9
This broad remedial approach has also been endorsed by the
EEOC's Affirmative Action Guidelines, 92 adopted in the interim between the Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Weber,
which attempt to create a defense against reverse discrimination
suits. The Guidelines require that the employer first conduct a selfanalysis to determine (1) whether employment practices harm a protected group or leave uncorrected the present effects of past discrimination, and (2) why the practices have such effect. 98 The Guidelines
permit the employer to engage in affirmative action if the self-analysis reveals that employment practices affect a protected group because they leave uncorrected the effects of past discrimination or re87. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "All persons. . .shall have
the same right to make and enforce contracts. . .as enjoyed by white citizens." Plaintiffs alleging employment discrimination may state a cause of action under both § 1981 (interference
with contractual rights) and Title VII; the causes of action are independent and distinct. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The Supreme Court has recently
held that proof of intentional discrimination is required under § 1981, that is, that the disparate impact theory of Griggs does not apply. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania,
458 U.S. 375 (1982). Section 1981 itself does not have a statute of limitations applicable to
employment discrimination cases. Time periods vary between the states. There are no administrative prerequisites to filing a § 1981 action, and a § 1981 plaintiff has no obligation to pursue
Title VII administrative remedies. Equitable and legal remedies (e.g., compensatory and punitive damages) are available under § 1981, while Title VII provides equitable remedies. For a
good treatment of employment discrimination claims under § 1981, see SULLIVAN, FEDERAL
STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION

467-87 (1980) [hereinafter cited as

SULLIVAN].

88. Setser, 657 F.2d at 968.
89. Id.
90. 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
91. Id. at 527.
92. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1982). The Guidelines originally appeared in 42 Fed. Reg.
64826-27 (1977).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(a) (1982). The Guidelines thus anticipated the Court in Weber
by suggesting that the employer can consider the effects on its own practices of discrimination
by others. The Guidelines do not specify any particular method for conducting the selfanalysis.

suit in disparate treatment or disparate impact.94 As in Weber, an
admission or finding of discrimination is not required.
Consistent with the earlier discussion of Weber, it seems sensible to resolve the apparent conflict between the conspicuous statistical imbalance language of Weber and the simple remedial approach
of Setser, Lehman, and the EEOC Guidelines in favor of the latter.
The remedial approach is consistent with Justice Brennan's rationale
and relieves the practical problems faced by the employer who may
bear responsibility for imbalances in its work force. A major shortcoming of the Weber result occurs as direct consequence of the ease
with which an employee can establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact. If the courts impose a heavy burden of production on the
employer to establish past discrimination, the employer may be
forced to admit Title VII liability. Therefore, the courts should not
require conspicuous imbalance in the employer's work force.
In addition to determining the statistical data that they will require as a basis for affirmative action (a quantitative analysis), the
courts must also define the appropriate labor force market to be used
for comparison purposes, a qualitative analysis. The district court's
opinion in Jurgens v. Thomas" illustrates how a failure to demonstrate the appropriate statistical disparity can contribute to employer
liability.
The plaintiffs in Jurgens challenged an affirmative action plan
instituted by the EEOC as employer, alleging that the plan discriminated against white males in favor of women and minorities.9, A
work force analysis and numerous other EEOC documents indicated
that the plan had achieved a level of women and minority employees
that "approximated or exceeded the national labor force."' 97 The
plaintiffs' statistics reinforced the EEOC's self-laudatory pronouncements but also indicated that white males were actually significantly
harmed by the affirmative action policies. 9"
Judge Higgenbotham distinguished the case before him from
Weber by noting that the EEOC's affirmative action plans "were not
adopted 'simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.'-99 He refused to extend the Weber principle to a situation in which there was
nether a history of employer discrimination nor a statistical imbal94.
95.

Id. § 1607.4(b).
29 FAIR EMPL. CAS. (BNA) 1561 (N.D. Tex. 1982).

96.

Id. at 1567.

97.

Id. at 1582.

98.

Id. at 1583.

99. Id. at 1581. Judge Higginbotham was careful to point out that the distinction was
not based on what he termed "legally inconsequential respects," namely that females and
Spanish-surnamed were preferred and the plan was promulgated by a government employer
who was specifically required to promulgate affirmative action plans. Id.

ance among EEOC employees.' 0 The EEOC plans operated to
maintain a balance, not to remedy discrimination, and thus they
reached too far. 1' 1
Certainly, in the absence of some disparity the court is correct
the plan did not fit the remedial framework of Weber. Weber's
remedial framework, however, is broader than Judge Higginbotham
acknowledged. In Weber, the employer required craft experience for
craft jobs. Assuming that craft experience is related to an employee's
ability to perform the job, an employer who requires craft experience
presumably has not discriminated against blacks absent a disparity
between his craft force and the craft job market. In Weber, the employer had essentially no black craft market from which to draw employees. Therefore, Kaiser probably could not have been found guilty
of discrimination. Consequently, Justice Brennan looked instead to
the general black labor market and found that the number of minorities in the craft market was disproportionate to the number of
blacks in the general labor market. Because Kaiser's craft force mirrored the societally discriminatory craft market, the employer could
implement an affirmative action plan to erase the effects of societal
discrimination on its work force. Thus, Kaiser could hire up to
thirty-seven percent black craftworkers, rather than the two percent
that would reflect the relevant craft labor market.
This discussion illustrates the need for a careful determination
of the relevant market for determining whether discrimination
against the preferred group has taken place. In Thomas, the EEOC
failed to demonstrate that its work force reflected a discriminatory
labor market. In contrast, Kaiser successfully demonstrated that its
workforce mirrored a conspicuous racial imbalance between the actual percentage of black craftworkers and the potential pool of
craftworkers (had the craft unions not discriminated against blacks).
In Thomas, the EEOC might have prevailed if it could have demonstrated that (1) women represent forty percent of the professional
workforce, but (2) women represent only fifteen percent of the managers who are trainable on the job, and (3) its work force mirrored
that conspicuous societal discrimination against women as managers.
Absent this showing, the court would not uphold the plan under the
Weber framework. Additionally, the EEOC failed to utilize one of
the narrower prerequisites for affirmative action - a finding of discrimination by a competent agency or a showing by the employer of
100. Id. at 1583.
101. Id. at 1583-84. Ironically, the EEOC's data, used originally in its self-laudatory
reports to the Civil Rights Commission, was later used to hoist the agency by its own petard.
The EEOC and the court had quite appropriately distinguished between professional and nonprofessional work forces-there was no employer discrimination in either category.

an imbalance between its work force and the relevant market for
managerial employees.
In summary, the difficulty in determining what constitutes sufficient disparity to justify affirmative action stems from the difficulty
in determining how much disparity is significant and what market
comparison is appropriate in discrimination analysis. The impracticability or impossibility of obtaining the most relevant statistics and
the lack of clarity of the judicial pronouncements addressing the relevant market help explain the Weber Court's willingness to justify
affirmative action by looking to the general labor market. Probably
more significant was Justice Brennan's view that craft discrimination
must be terminated, whether that discrimination is due to employers'
Title VII violations or the craft markets' underutilization of minorities. As Weber illustrates, when the employer is immune from attack
under traditional notions of employer discrimination, this discriminatory cycle will be broken only if the courts permit employers to institute affirmative action as a response to a broader societal
discrimination.
Weber suggests that the employer should be allowed considerable latitude in remedying discrimination upon a demonstration of societal discrimination in the relevant labor market and reflection of
that societal discrimination in its workforce. Until the Supreme
Court clarifies what constitutes a showing of systemic discrimination,
the courts should find that an employer satisfies its first burden of
establishing the legitimacy affirmative action by showing any of the
following: (1) a competent agency or court has found a discriminatory hiring pattern; (2) the employer has identified a racial imbalance in its work force, typically though not necessarily through a
comparison of its workforce with the relevant qualified work force; or
(3) the employer can point to a conspicuous societal imbalance between a specialized workforce and the general labor force, and this
imbalance is reflected in the employer's own workforce.
Next, the courts should require that the challenged affirmative
action be remedial. This would include a plan implemented in response to societal discrimination reflected in the employer's own
workforce. The employer should be given the reasonable benefit of
the doubt in determining the remedial nature of the plan, in light of
the uncertainties of defending a systemic challenge and the Weber
policy of promoting voluntary action to end discrimination.
B. Is the Plan Acceptable, and Was the Employer's Action Taken
Pursuant to the Plan?
Two possible limitations on affirmative action plans arise from
Justice Brennan's observations of the Weber plan: (1) the plan was

not "an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees,"'' 0 and
(2) the plan was a temporary measure. 10 3 The lower courts have
tended to merge these two considerations into the general inquiry
whether the plan is a reasonable response to the underlying problem.
Thus, the Weber considerations must be highlighted before a discussion of the lower courts' response.
By observing that the Weber plan did not constitute an absolute
bar to the advancement of whites, Justice Brennan suggested that an
affirmative action plan must be reasonable or equitable with regard
to nonminority employees. The Court, however, did approve a fifty
percent quota, which substantially exceeded the ultimate thirty-seven
percent goal and whose clear purpose was to accelerate realization of
the plan's goal. The nature of the approved quota and Justice Brennan's choice of the word "absolute" suggest that the employer should
be afforded substantial latitude in framing the quota, a view confirmed by subsequent lower court opinions.
Justice Brennan further stressed the temporary nature of the
Weber plan. That plan provided that the preferential selection would
end upon attainment of a thirty-seven percent minority work
force. 104 It should be noted, however, that since incumbent white
craft employees would not be bumped, 08 raising the minority percentage to thirty-seven percent would clearly take a considerable period of time unless the employer greatly expanded its craft force.
The fifty percent black quota and the necessary natural attrition of
white employees suggest that "temporary" in practice means not
permanent, but still a long time. It is not unreasonable to allow a
relatively long period once the Court accepts the principle that an
employer can act to ameliorate societal discrimination. Furthermore,
if Kaiser had shortened the time period, then the impact on white
employees would have been even more restrictive, resulting in either
increased trammeling of their rights or their exclusion from consideration for the training program. The employer should be free, then,
to decide the plan's duration.
Justice Brennan's emphasis on the virtue of temporariness raises
the question whether Kaiser's affirmative action would really be temporary. Although the plan had a theoretical ending point, what
would Kaiser do if later hiring patterns or employee attrition once
again brought the proportion of black craftworkers below thirty102. 443 U.S. at 208 (1979).
103. The last of the five possible limitations raised at the end of Justice Brennan's opinion, the fact that the plan did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of whites, will be discussed in the analysis of the seniority override problem. See infra notes 227-345 and accompanying text.
104. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
105. Id.

seven percent? Justice Brennan observed that the plan was "not intended to maintain racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance." 106 Would Kaiser have to terminate its plan
and wait for sufficient disparity in its own work force to implement a
10 7
new plan, despite a persistent industry-wise imbalance?
In Kromnick v. School District of Philadelphia,"8 the district
court refused to read Weber broadly. In Philadelphia, where there
had been a history of racially identifiable schools and too few black
teachers, the school board decided to continue a quota system at
each school to maintain faculty integration. The court held that the
quota fell on the impermissible side of the demarcation between permissible and impermissible racially cognizant classifications.' 09
Thus, while Weber's rationale permits an employer to engage in
affirmative action on the basis of societal rather than personal culpability, Justice Brennan's limitations suggest that the employer cannot
use quota hiring as a permanent solution to a racial imbalance in its
work force. This result comports with other Title VII principles.
Under Griggs, an employer must take steps necessary to alleviate
discriminatory hiring practices. Allowing the employer to engage in
permanent quota hiring constitutes a disincentive for the employer to
adopt fair hiring practices that solve the underlying problem rather
than merely treat the symptoms.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Connecticut v. Teal" 0
reinforces concern for individuals who suffer as the result of "bottom-line" hiring policies. In Teal, the eligibility of employees for
promotion was based upon a multi-part evaluation system. The first
part of the evaluation system consisted of a written test, which an
employee had to pass to be further considered for promotion. Although this written test had a disparate impact on black employees,
the employer compensated by promoting enough of the black employees who qualified after the completion of the evaluation system
106. Id. at 208 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun also referred to the fact the program is not attempting to "maintain" an achieved balance. Id. at 216 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).09
107. Professor Schatzki has commented:
I find it difficult to believe that the temporary quality of such plans must
necessarily be tied to the individual's getting a proper balance .... On the
other hand, so long as there is any imbalance in society, the Court's primary
logic would permit any employer to have an affirmative action plan. The Court's
limitation suggests something less grand. In-between stances, which the Court
may yet adopt, would permit a plan to remain in effect so long as the involved
employer, the industry of which it is a part, or the employer's geographical area
has an arguably inappropriate disparity in the number of oppressed minorities in
the work force.
Schatzki, supra note 72, at 70.
108. 555 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
109. Id. at 255.
110. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).

so that no discrepancy resulted between the percentage of all black
employees and the percentage of promoted black employees in the
employer's work force. The plaintiffs were several black employees
who failed the discriminatory written test part of the evaluation and
consequently alleged that because of their race, they were denied
further consideration for employment. The Court agreed that quota
relief alone did not protect an employer from Title VII claims by
other members of the favored minority group that the employment
practice adversely affected them.
Obvious difficulties, like the weight to be given Weber's concern
for the "temporary" nature of the plan, arise in determining when an
employer can attempt to remedy past discrimination if he is no
longer strongly implicated in the underlying problem. Absent effective limitations on the employer's ability to engage in racial preferences, the Weber affirmative action exception devours the Title VII
anti-discrimination mandate. The foregoing considerations suggest a
reasonable limitation: the employer should only be able to act to the
extent his work force mirrors the larger past discrimination.
Thoughtful lower courts typically have analyzed the validity of
the plan primarily in terms of the relationship between the plan and
the treatment of minorities. In Setser, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, referring to the Weber plan as a guide, required that an
employer show, with reference to its particular situation, that the
operation of its affirmative action plan is "reasonably related to the
plan's remedial purpose."1 1 The reasonable relation standard ensures that the plan is not arbitrary and is not being used as a subterfuge for hiring minority workers. At the same time, the analysis
should consider relevant factors other than the attributes of the
Weber plan in weighing the evidence presented by the employer.
The EEOC's Affirmative Action Guidelines appear to have anticipated the lower courts' articulation of the criteria for plan approval. After the self-analysis and reasonable basis criteria are met,
the Guidelines require the affirmative action plan to be reasonable in
relation to the problems disclosed by the self-analysis.'
The Guidelines envision the employer taking steps other than simply defining
goals and timetables to redress underutilization. They require a plan
which ensures that the affirmative action system operates fairly in
the future, avoids unnecessary restrictions on the opportunities of
nonminority employees, and is "maintained only so long as is necessary." ' s The Guidelines are consistent, therefore, with the Weber
emphasis that a reasonable affirmative action plan should be "tempo111.657

F.2d at 968.

112. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1982).
113. Id.

rary." The Guidelines set forth factors that should be helpful in balancing the interests of protected minorities with the other factors
considered in the Setser analysis."'
Justice Brennan's willingness to approve a plan under which
one-half of new employees hired must be of a minority race, and
which would continue for a lengthy and undetermined, but temporary period to redress societal discrimination indicates that the employer should be accorded latitude in formulating the plan. The
Weber Court's interpretation that Title VII policy is to encourage
voluntary redress of discrimination suggests that the benefit of the
doubt in determining the propriety of a challenged plan should go to
the employer.115 The Supreme Court's unwillingness to articulate
standards to determine if the plan "fell on the permissible side of the
line"' 1 6 also suggests that the courts should err on the side of generosity to the employer.
The lower courts have been exceedingly liberal in approving
written plans when some basis for affirmative action exists. 1 7 Thus
far, courts appear more concerned in reverse discrimination suits
with finding that a written affirmative action plan is in force than
with the reasonableness of a specific plan. For example, in Lehman
v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.," s a regional manager indicated that
race was one of the factors considered in hiring decisions, but that he
was neither aware of the provisions of the plan nor acting pursuant
to it. The court refused to extend the Weber blessing to an ad hoc
preference for a minority person: "While a particular affirmative action decision may be consistent with the spirit of the Weber discussion, we believe that the substantive and procedural safeguards discussed in Weber must be part of the affirmative action process. In
this way, safeguards are built into the system to insure fairness and
consistency. '"" 9 Although one leading commentator'20 suggests that
an unwritten affirmative action plan conforms at least to the spirit of
Weber, the case authority and the EEOC Guidelines are clearly of
the contrary opinion."'' A properly written affirmative action plan
114. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
115. As indicated in the next section, the courts have even been willing to find that
seniority over-rides are justified to preserve minority gains under the broad rubric of "reasonable response to past discrimination."
116. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
117. See supra notes 78-102 and accompanying text.
118. 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
119. Id. at 528 n.16.
120. Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 29 (1981).
121. See Harmon v. San Diego County, 477 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Cal. 1979). In Harmon, the court inferred that Weber required a plan and rejected an affirmative action defense

because the county did not undertake a concerted, reasoned program of preferential employment. See also Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
One court has approved a written plan which required that hiring recommendations be

prevents arbitrary action and invidious discrimination, ensures the
remedial nature of the action, and precludes after-the-fact rationalizations for discrimination.
An employer must be able to demonstrate that the challenged
action was undertaken pursuant to a valid plan. This requirement is
implicit in Setser because the court indicated that the employer is
entitled to summary judgment if the plan is remedial and has reasonable goals "unless there is a genuine issue as to whether the treatment of the plaintiff was related to the plan.' 1 2' Similarly, in Lehman, although the employer apparently had established a detailed
national plan for affirmative action, the local manager was largely
unaware of the program. The court held that, unless the manager
was acting pursuant to the plan, "Yellow Freight can hardly assert
the plan as a defense in this action. ' ' "23 Thus, following Setser, the

third burden on the employer in a reverse discrimination case is to
produce "evidence that its treatment of the plaintiff was a direct
consequence of its implementation of a bona fide affirmative action
plan."' 2 '
Many lower courts have gone beyond the mere application of
Justice Brennan's limitations in analyzing the validity of affirmative
action plans and the particular action being challenged. These courts
are requiring (1) that the affirmative action plan be reasonably related to its remedial purpose, (2) that the plan be reduced to writing,
and (3) that the challenged action be undertaken pursuant to a valid
written plan. In evaluating the plan, the courts should consider factors other than those enumerated by Justice Brennan in Weber. Additionally, affirmative action should not be tolerated as a permanent
substitute for measures ensuring bias-free hiring practices.
C. Summary Judgment for the Employer
If the employer demonstrates by competent evidence that its affirmative action plan is reasonably related to a remedial purpose and
that its treatment of the plaintiff was pursuant to that plan, then the
employer should be granted summary judgment unless the plaintiff
raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect to one of these
criteria. 2 Evaluating the validity of this position requires the examaccompanied by evidence that minority candidates were sought; the plan set no goals or guidelines. Cohen v. Community College of Philadelphia, 484 F. Supp. 411, 430-34 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
122. 657 F.2d at 970.
123. Lehman, 651 F.2d at 524. See also Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012
(D.C. Cir. 1981), in which the court refused to grant summary judgment for the employer
where the record did not demonstrate that the affirmative action plan was applicable to the
challenged hiring.
124. Setser, 657 F.2d at 969.

125. See, e.g., id. at 962.

ination of several issues: (1) the role of summary judgment generally; (2) the reluctance to grant summary judgment in civil rights
actions involving the element of intent; (3) the question whether reverse discrimination is appropriate under employment discrimination
theories in which discrimination may be presumed under certain circumstances, and (4) the policy encouraging voluntary employer action to redress employment disparities. A related consideration, although one which appears to have had little impact on the courts, is
the EEOC's attempt, through its Affirmative Action Guidelines, 126 to
provide a defense suitable against a motion for summary judgment
under section 713(b)(1) of Title VII. 2 7
Because of the availability of a motion for summary judgment,
a party can require -an opponent to support his or her allegations
before trial and not rest merely on the pleadings. Nevertheless, the
utility of summary judgment as a matter of practice is subject to
considerable doubt. The courts seem reluctant to force the parties
"to put up or shut up" and often apply the "slightest doubt" rule in
determining whether a "genuine issue of material fact exists."'"6 The
slightest doubt standard is primarily traceable to cases in which the
nonmoving party has difficulty obtaining information.' 29 An example
is employment discrimination cases, in which the employer has a'monopoly over most of the crucial information: evidence of subjective
intent or objective information about employment policies and
practice.
A second factor limiting the effectiveness of summary judgment
in employment discrimination litigation is the centrality of credibility when state of mind is an issue.13 0 This issue usually involves factual inferences over which reasonable persons could differ. In such
cases, witness demeanor becomes particularly important. Nevertheless, defendants have been awarded summary judgment in cases
"turning on state of mind when plaintiffs' allegations were not sufficiently supported to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact."' 1 For purposes of discrimination litigation, the slightest
doubt rule is too deferential - the nonmoving party should be entitled to the benefit of only a reasonable doubt.
Because of these considerations courts have become reluctant to
126.
127.

29 C.F.R. § 1608 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1981).
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150 (2d ed. 1977). A slight doubt, of

course, may not create a "genuine issue of material fact," the standard applicable under

FED.

R. Civ. P. 56.
129. Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J.
745, 762 (1974).
130. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 2730

(1983).
131.

Id. at 262-65.

grant summary judgment against plaintiffs in Title VII cases, especially if the plaintiff raises doubt about the defendant's justification
for the allegedly discriminatory action.13 2 Nevertheless, even in the
employment discrimination context, when the employer has met his
burden of showing that a genuine issue of material fact does not
exist, "merely conclusory assertions of discrimination are not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment."' 3
In several recent cases, employers charged with reverse discrimination have successfully obtained summary judgments because the
alleged discrimination was pursuant to a bona fide affirmative action
plan. In Setser, the court of appeals explained the necessary inquiry
as following a particular sequence: if the employer produces evidence
that its treatment of the plaintiff was pursuant to a "bona fide" affirmative action plan, the employer should win summary judgment
unless the plaintiff can impeach the plan's remedial purpose. In that
case, the court should consider the plan's propriety and may still
grant the employer summary judgment.""
The focus of the inquiry in a reverse discrimination case is not
only the employer's motive. The basis for the affirmative action plan
and the reasonableness of the plan are legal issues for the court even
when the plaintiff has a right to a jury trial. The third issue, whether
the treatment of the plaintiff was related to the plan, is indeed a
factual issue. For this question to reach the jury, however, the plaintiff must raise some basis for believing that his treatment was not
pursuant to the plan. In this regard, the adoption of the plan alone is
strong probative evidence that the employer has acted pursuant to it.
Furthermore, documentary evidence submitted to demonstrate the
basis for the plan and the existence of a plan decrease the credibility
problem normally associated with an inquiry emphasizing motive.
Thus, the motive issue is more focused and manageable in a challenge to action taken pursuant to a written affirmative action plan,
and the courts should not be as reluctant to grant summary judgment as they are in other intent-oriented civil rights cases.
Another important factor making summary judgment more appropriate in reverse discrimination cases is that the inference of discrimination applicable in Title VII cases is inappropriate in reverse
discrimination cases. The McDonnell Douglas Court created a rebuttable presumption of discrimination upon the plaintiff's establishment of a prima facie disparate treatment violation' " in situations in
132.
620 F.2d
133.
134.
135.

A good example is a recent school discharge case, Rodriguez v. Board of Educ.,
362, 367 (2d Cir. 1980).
Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 631 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1980).
Setser, 657 F.2d at 969-70.
See supra note 5.

which it is fair and reasonable to shift the burden of proceeding to
the employer.136 The presumption in a suit by a minority person
stems from the belief that once the common legitimate reasons for
refusal to hire are eliminated, it is probable that rejection of that
person is attributable to discrimination. It is appropriate, therefore,
to allow the minority person, against whom discrimination is frequent, to establish easily a prima facie case and force the employer
to articulate a lawful reason for his action.
The factual basis for the inference and the underlying policy to
relieve discriminated-against minorities from facing an insurmountable burden of proving the employer's intent are not applicable to the
reverse discrimination case. As the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia observed:
The original McDonnell Douglas standard required the

plaintiff to show "that he belongs to a racial minority." Membership in a socially disfavored group was the assumption on
which the entire McDonnell Douglas analysis was predicated,
for only in that context can it be stated as a general rule that
the "light of common experience" would lead a fact finder to
infer discriminatory motive from the unexplained hiring of an
outsider rather than a group member. Whites are also a protected group under Title VII, but it defies common sense to suggest that the promotion of a black employee justifies an inference of prejudice against white co-workers in our present
society.18 7
An inference of discrimination is not warranted from the bare-boned
failure to hire a qualified nonminority person for an available position. Therefore, the courts should be more demanding in forcing the
reverse discrimination plaintiff to come forward with evidence of discrimination, particularly if an affirmative action plan is in effect.
Furthermore, the Weber policy and the Setser court's analysis of
that policy indicate that the employer should be encouraged rather
than discouraged from undertaking voluntary affirmative action in
appropriate cases. The policy underlying most employment discrimination cases of easing the plaintiff's task of proving the employer's
intent upon a showing of facts from which it is reasonable to infer
discriminatory intent is not applicable to the affirmative action context. It appears, therefore, that the greater willingness to grant summary judgment to the employer in such cases is justified. If the
"slightest doubt" rule or its equivalent were to be applied regarding
the employer's assertion that his action was taken pursuant to a bona
136.

See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44

(1977).
137.

Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017.

fide affirmative action plan, the employer would be thrust precisely
between the rock and the hard place from which Weber intended to
extricate him.
The above analysis does not suggest that summary judgment is
inevitable in affirmative action cases. 13 8 In Parker v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad, the court stressed the need for an adequate factual
record; the employer cannot merely describe its policies or its effect
in conclusory terms.' 3 9 Since the employer is privy to the most probative information, it should have the burden of going forward, thus
giving the plaintiff a reasonable chance to create a genuine issue of
fact. Even though the motive issue is more focused in affirmative
action cases than in typical Title VII cases, the greatest opportunity
for the reverse discrimination plaintiff to withstand a motion for
summary judgment would be to substantiate reasons for the unfavorable action other than conformance to an affirmative action plan.
Given the Weber policy of encouraging voluntary remedial affirmative action, the Setser-Parkerapproach is a sensible balance between
the Weber policy and traditional summary judgment doctrine.
As previously indicated, section 713(b)(1) of the EEOC Guidelines attempts to provide a defense to a reverse discrimination charge
against an employer who has adopted an affirmative action plan if
the employer "pleads and proves that the act or omission complained
of was in good faith, in conformity with, and in reliance on any written interpretation or opinion of the Commission."140 The Guidelines
provide that if the employer follows three steps, "a reasonable self
analysis, a reasonable basis for concluding action is appropriate, and
reasonable action,' 4' the section 713(b) defense applies if the selfanalysis and plan are also dated and in writing. 14 Although the
Guidelines offer more guidance than Justice Brennan's opinion in
Weber and appear to be consistent with Weber, the courts have virtually ignored them.
A number of factors are responsible for this neglect. Initially,
the Guidelines were not applicable to Kaiser Aluminum, since they
were not promulgated until after consideration of that case by the
two lower courts. Additionally, the Supreme Court has not given the
EEOC Guidelines much deference in recent years, thereby discouraging employers and courts from relying on them.1'4 3
138. In several cases, summary judgment for the employer was appropriately denied.
See, e.g., Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981); Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Valentine v. Drug Enforcement Admin1982).
istration, 544 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Ill.
139. Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d at 1014.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-12(b) (1981).
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.4 (1982).
142. Id. § 1608.4(d).
143. The Supreme Court has never come to grips with a possible limit on the EEOC's

More importantly, the Guidelines may not preclude injunctive
relief, declaratory relief, and recovery of attorneys' fees. Thus, the
employer would have to rely primarily on the Weber opinion for a
complete defense in any event. For example, the Ninth Circuit has
limited the section 713(b) defense to liability for back pay. The

court relied on the statutory language that "no person shall be subject to any liability or punishment" if he relies on the written inter-

pretation, 44 even though section 713(b) goes on to state that "[sluch
a defense, if established, shall be a bar to the action."' 45 This lanability to promulgate substantive regulations. Section 713(b)(1) states that an employer who
relies on EEOC interpretations as a shield has a defense. However, § 713(a) explicitly grants
authority only to "issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the
provisions of this title" (emphasis added). In widely quoted language, the Court in Griggs
pithily dealt with the substantive regulations:
The EEOC, having enforcement responsibility, has issued guidelines interpreting § 703(h) to permit only the use of job related tests. The administrative
interpretation of the Act by the enforcement agency is entitled to great deference. Since this act and its legislative history support the Commission's construction, this affords good reasons to treat the Guidelines as expressing the will of
Congress.
401 U.S. at 433-34 (footnote and citations omitted). The limit suggested in Griggs was used
only two years later by the Court to refuse to grant full effect to the EEOC Guidelines largely
equating alienage discrimination with prohibited national origin discrimination. In Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973), the Court stated: "The guideline relied on. . .is no
doubt entitled to great deference but the deference must have limits where, as here, application of the guidelines would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent not to reach
the employment practice in question."
The Court appeared to erode further the great deference posture when it refused to follow
EEOC Guidelines in reaching its interpretation that pregnancy-based discrimination is not sex
discrimination in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The Court noted that the
EEOC regulation was not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, it was inconsistent
with an opinion letter issued earlier, and the Guidelines conflicted with a regulation of the
wage and hour administrator. Id at 142-43. The most comprehensive basis for determining the
amount of deference to be accorded to interpretive rulings like the EEOC Guidelines was
provided by Justice Jackson in Skidmore v. Swift Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944):
We consider that the rulings, inter- pretation and opinion of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which
courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
the power to control.
The lower courts generally have also become increasingly cautious of uncritical reliance
on the Guidelines in areas other than affirmative action. Nevertheless, the lower courts do
resort to the Guidelines, often with the appropriate "not bound" disclaimers, particularly if the
interpretation touches testing and test validation which involve great professional expertise,
Easley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 616 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1980), or "matters-such as statistical inference-beyond judicial expertise," Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 533 F. Supp. 844,
854 n.25 (D. Del. 1982).
144. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 519 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1975). See Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII: Standards of Permissibility, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
291, 317 (1980).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b)(2) (1981). One commentator thinks the provisions are
consistent and supports the limited effect:
However, the preferable view is that the first sentence modifies the last, i.e., that
the defense is merely a bar to an action to impose back pay liability. Consequently, an employer who establishes a section 713(b) defense is still subject to

guage, of course, suggests a broader effect for the section 713(b)
defense.
Possibly, the primary reason the Guidelines have been ignored
despite the need for clear standards after Weber is that great caution
and appropriate timing are required in invoking the defense. Not
only must the analysis and plan be in writing, but the employer must
also demonstrate that he actually relied on the interpretation." 6
In view of these demanding requirements, the EEOC also has
attempted to provide a section 713(b) defense for an employer who
engages in affirmative action within the spirit if not the letter of the
Commission's Guidelines. This can be accomplished in two ways.
First, if during the investigation of a discrimination charge the Commission determines that the employer's affirmative action program
essentially conforms to the Guidelines, then even though the employer did not rely on the Guidelines in formulating the plan, the
Commission's determination of that case will constitute a written interpretation or opinion under section 713(b)(1). The Guidelines submit that this EEOC interpretation regarding the employer's compliance may be relied upon and asserted as a defense if new charges
involving similar facts and circumstances are thereafter filed against
14
the respondent.
Second, the Guidelines assert that even though the self-analysis
and plan are not in writing a finding of "reasonable cause of discrimthe whole range of equitable remedies (excluding back pay) as well as attorneys'
fees and costs.
SULLIVAN, supra note 87, at 546. Such a construction seems consistent with the EEOC's limited general authorization to adopt procedural regulations in § 713(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e12(a).
146. See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Va. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Eirhart v. Libby-Owens Ford Co., 616 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.
1980). A related problem is that in the past courts have interpreted the § 713(b)(1) defense
rather narrowly when it has been invoked by employers to justify discrimination against minorities. Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (1971); Note, Voluntary Affirmative Action, supra note 144. The language of these cases undoubtedly will be asserted against an
employer trying to justify minority preference under his affirmative action program although
the employer is very likely implementing the Title VII policy as declared in Weber. In the
process of narrowly construing the exception, the courts have looked to the EEOC's restrictive
definition of what constitutes a written interpretation or opinion:
(a) A letter entitled "opinion letter" and signed by the General Counsel on behalf of the Commission, or
(b) matter published and specifically desig- nated as such in the Federal Register, including the Commission's Guidelines on Affirmative Action ....
29 C.F.R. § 1601.33 (1982).
Part (b) has obviously been amended since the promulgation of the affirmative action
Guidelines; the emphasis is to reflect the amendment. The affirmative action Guidelines, if
properly invoked, certainly would seem to satisfy the requirements for a "written interpretation." The tendency toward a narrow interpretation seems inappropriate with these Guidelines,
which have been carefully formulated to allow the § 713(b) defense in a manner consistent
with Title VII policy.
147. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.10(a) (1982).

ination in the individual case" 1 8 will not necessarily follow. The failure to put the plan in writing, however, will make the employer's
position more precarious.?1 9
Since the Guidelines were not adopted until early 1979 and
were highly suspect until Weber, few employers could have undertaken the required analysis and adopted a plan until long after the
Weber decision. Considering also the time necessary for an affirmative action case to be filed with and decided by a district court, it is
understandable that the EEOC's defense has not yet been seriously
considered by the courts.'

Furthermore, many employers previously charged with reverse
discrimination may have elected to rely on the more vague Weber
formulation. The lower courts' willingness to broadly apply the
Weber rationale suggests that such a tactical decision may be wise

unless the employer has conducted a careful self-analysis and tailored his affirmative action plan to meet the conclusions reached
with regard to underutilization and market conditions. The problems
accompanying the section 713(b) defense, however, should not inhibit courts from referring to the Guidelines for assistance in articulating more definite standards for an affirmative action defense, provided that the Guidelines are consistent with Weber.
D. Section 1981 Challenges, Public Sector Employees, and Seniority Override Provisions
The holding in Weber was limited to private employers and ad-

dressed a Title VII challenge to preferential hiring on racial
148. The EEOC must find whether the charge is based upon reasonable cause unless the
party requests his or her right to sue letter after the 180 days during which the party cannot
pursue a court action. The EEOC finding, however, is not binding on the court. For a brief
discussion of the relation between the "charge," the EEOC finding, and a private suit, see M.
ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN, & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 395 (1982).
149. "[T]he absence of a written self analysis and a written affirmative action plan or
program may make it more difficult to provide credible evidence that the analysis was conducted, and that action was taken pursuant to a plan or program based on the analysis." 29
C.F.R. § 1608.4(d)(2) (1982). This last provision conflicts with the spirit of post-Weber case
law and, therefore, is suspect. But the conflict is relatively unimportant because the charging
party can bring a Title VII action irrespective of the EEOC finding. The attempt to provide a
defense to future similar charges based on the affirmative action program which does not totally conform to the Guidelines may prove troublesome when the plan does not closely conform
to the Guideline requirements. The EEOC's subsequent "opinion letter" would be inconsistent
with the Guidelines. In any event, the questioned action must have been "taken in good faith
with and in reliance on" the EEOt opinion. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
150. The Guidelines were promulgated fifteen years after Title VII was adopted and
only after the Fifth Circuit opinion in Weber, while the case was being considered in the
Supreme Court, which hardly adds credibility. See supra note 143 (discussion of Gilbert).
Nevertheless, the Guidelines appear consistent with the Weber Court's interpretation of Title
VII policy and intent. The agency appears to have thoroughly considered the difficult problem
faced by employers, enforcement agencies, and affected employees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1
(1982).

grounds.' 5 ' Although the decision left many questions unanswered, 52 this article concentrates on how lower courts have dealt
with challenges to affirmative action by public employers and with
seniority overrides in layoffs. This article first deals briefly with challenges brought under section 1981158 in an attempt to avoid the
Weber defense to a Title VII action.
1. Section 1981 and affirmative action. - In McDonald v.
Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co.,'" the United States Supreme
Court held that section 1981, as well as Title VII, prohibits racial
discrimination against both whites and nonwhites. Furthermore, the
Court held in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency'" that Congress
did not impliedly repeal section 1981 when it adopted Title VII.
Subsequently, in Setser v. Novack Investment Co.,"' the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the Weber affirmative action de-

fense applies to a section 1981 challenge. 5 7 The court noted the
151. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
152. In what appears to be a relatively easy area, the Ninth Circuit rebuffed a challenge
to a female preference in an affirmative action program for California Highway Patrol persons.
The court held that, although the primary focus of congressional debate was race, "Congress
did not intend, when it added to Title Vii the prohibition of gender-based employment discrimination, to prohibit voluntary affirmative action programs designed to correct long-standing sexual imbalances in the work force." EEOC v. La Riviere, 682 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.
1982). The result conforms with the general interpretation that sex discrimination is to receive
the same treatment under Title VII as race discrimination. See, e.g., Hunter v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 639 F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 1981), which involved an unsuccessful challenge by
white females to a preference for blacks. The commentators seem to support the result. See,
e.g., Blumrosen, Affirmative Action in Employment, 34 RUTGERs L. REv. 1, 14 (1981); Note,
Voluntary Affirmative Action, supra note 144, at 319.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides as follows:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and extractions of every kind, and to no other.
Section 1981 provides coverage for only race discrimination, not sex or religious discrimination. It applies to both public and private employers. Jones v. Alfred Mayer, 392 U.S., 409
(1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 420 U.S. 160 (1976).
154. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
155. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
156. 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981).
157. The Setser court further held, without explanation, that whether an affirmative
action plan is bona fide is a question for the court, not the jury. One can infer that the court
deemed it necessary to preserve the desired consistency between Title VII and § 1981. As
Blumrosen has noted, Congress apparently did not want jury trials on Title VII cases because
it wanted to change the very community sense of the status of minorities and women which
had led to discrimination against them. See Blumrosen, supra note 152, at 37. Even assuming
that a jury would follow a court's instructions regarding an affirmative action plan's basis or
reasonableness, those standards have not been clearly articulated.
Two other courts of appeals took a different approach in rebuffing § 1981 challenges to
public sector affirmative action plans. They referred to the nexus between § 1981 and the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments and found no § 1981 cause of action absent a constitutional violation. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979); Local
Union No. 55 v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1980). These cases, which appear to

irony of allowing the recently disinterred section 1981 to be "used
now to prohibit the only effective remedy for past discriminatory employment practices."' " Thus, the Setser court concluded that the
Supreme Court "implicitly approved the use of race-conscious plans
to remedy past discrimination under section 1981."'159
The Setser court referred to both the general tendency of courts
construing fair employment rights under section 1981 to use Title
VII as a guide and the problems that an employer would face if the
courts failed to construe the two statutes consistently. While already
walking the tightrope between liability for past discrimination and
lawsuits for reverse discrimination, employers might find themselves
barred by section 1981 from remedying discriminatory practices that
are illegal under Title VII. If the two statutes embodied divergent
standards, "the private employer's ability to conform its conduct to
federal discrimination statutes would become more complicated and
uncertain than it already is." 160 The Setser court thus equated the
affirmative action standards of section 1981 with those of Title VII.
The Setser approach is reasonable and necessary to encourage
voluntary affirmative action and to protect the employer who implements affirmative action. Courts should attempt to construe statutes
dealing with similar subject matter consistently, while emphasizing
the legislative intent of the later statute, 161 especially when the subsequent statute deals more specifically with the particular problem at
issue.''1
2. Affirmative Action in the Public Sector. - Public employers became subject to basically the same requirements under Title
VII as private employers16 when Congress amended Title VII in
1972 to extend coverage to public employers.' Certainly Congress
intended the full measure of Title VII protection to extend to state

and local employees, including the benefits of the disparate impact
have anticipated the Supreme Court's decision in General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 102 S. Ct. 3141 (1982), will be discussed in the next section, which deals with possible
equal protection problems arising from affirmative action in the public sector.
158. Seiser, 657 F.2d at 966.
159. Id. at 966-67.
160. Id. at 968.
161. Id. at 967 n.5; Blumrosen, supra note 152, at 35.
162. Blumrosen, supra note 152, at 35.
163. The variations relate to exceptions for political appointees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(t),
and enforcement responsibility, id. § 2000e-5(f).
As one commentator notes, "It seems clear from the 1972 Amendment's integration of
public sector coverage into private sector Title VII law that Congress intended normal Title
VII principles to govern public defendants." SULLIVAN, supra note 87, at 205. See Scott v.
City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
164. Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103. The amendment is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this amendment in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

theory developed in Griggs.'" But because in Weber the Supreme
Court indicated a willingness to allow private employers considerable
latitude in adopting affirmative action plans, Weber provides no direct guidance for the public employer.
Thus, despite coextensive Title VII coverage, the position of the
public employer who institutes an affirmative action program remains precarious. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bratton v.
City of Detroit'66 observed as follows:

The Supreme Court has not provided the kind of guidance
in the constitutional context that Weber affords under Title VII.
Instead, the Court has issued a series of opinions in the course of
two significant cases on this issue, Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke and Fullilove v. Klutznick . . . .The only
clear consensus to be gained from these various statements is
that in any affirmative action program (1) some governmental
interest must be served, and (2) the program must somehow be
directed toward the achievement of that objective. Beyond this,
however, there appears to be no agreement on the nature of the

governmental interest which must be at stake, on the finding
necessary to establish the presence of the interest, nor on the
standard under which the67 method employed to achieve that interest is to be reviewed.
This section examines the lower courts' treatment of the equal protection questions raised in this quoted passage from the Bratton decision. The relevant Supreme Court cases then are analyzed and followed by development of a rationale for upholding carefully
formulated public sector affirmative action programs.
The relative lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court in
dealing with public sector affirmative action programs and the approval of such programs in the private sector in Weber have resulted
in the lower courts' use of Weber for guidance. 16 Essentially, the
courts indicate that public employers can engage in affirmative action in situations comparable to those in which private employers
may do so. The lower courts' attitude is an ambivalence between a
perceived need for affirmative action to respond to past discrimination and the need to examine carefully the plan and circumstances
165. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976). Article V empowers Congress "to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of
this article." U.S. CONST. art. V. For a concise discussion of "the apparent anomaly" of using
§ 5 to extend protection beyond §1, see SULLIVAN, supra note 87, at 206 (concluding that
Congress can so extend Title VII coverage).
166. 704F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), modified, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983).
167. Id. at 885.
168. See, e.g., Price v. Civil Serv. Comm. 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604 P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr.
475 (1980); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).

leading to its adoption.
This ambivalence is reflected first in the level of scrutiny that
the courts apply to public sector affirmative action challenges. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Valentine v. Smith1 69 that
"[any racial preference must receive a searching examination to
make certain that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.
Until we know more about the long term effects of affirmative ac'tion, however, we are reluctant to discourage states from acting voluntarily to remedy past racial discrimination."17 0 In Detroit Police
Officers' Association v. Young,171 the Sixth Circuit explained why
the level of scrutiny need not be too strict:
Bakke and Weber make it clear that a case involving a claim of
discrimination against members of the white majority is not a
simple mirror image of a case involving claims of discrimination
against minorities. One analysis is required when those for
whose benefit the Constitution was amended or a statute enacted
claim discrimination. A different analysis must be made when
the claimants are not members of a class historically subjected
to discrimination. When claims are brought by members of a

group formerly subjected to discrimination the case moves with
the grain of the Constitution and national policy. A suit which
seeks to prevent public action designed to alleviate the effects of
past discrimination moves against the grain, and the official actions complained of must be subjected to the analysis prescribed
in Weber and the plurality opinion in Bakke which we find
172
controlling.
The ambivalence in the scrutiny demanded by the equal protec-

tion clause is also evident in courts' evaluations of the basis for the
challenged affirmative action plan. The lower courts often have relied on Justice Powell's language in Bakke that ameliorating discrimination could present a justified state interest only in the presence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations.178 The courts, however, have
relaxed these requirements in light of Weber's broad rationale and
the Supreme Court's decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick. 17 4 In Fullilove, the Court upheld a ten percent minority set-aside for government contracts in the absence of any real findings of discrimination
T
or underutilization by Congress. 7
169.
170.
171.

654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 509.
608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).

172.

Id. at 697.

173.
174.
175.

University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308-09 (1978).
448 U.S. 448 (1980).
See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.

Although two courts have referred to the Bakke requirement of
findings by a public body with "competence" to act, 116 the courts
allow that body to rely on information developed by others and on
findings of a broad societal discrimination rather than discrimination
7
by particular employers, as in Weber and Fullilove.1
7 For example,

the Second Circuit has noted that the plan "need not be based on a
particularized finding of past discrimination by every employer or
union affected," but "a finding of discrimination in the industry concerned suffices. '1 78 In light of post-Bakke developments, these courts
seem to have little incentive to be terribly demanding when deciding
what findings are required. It seems fair to say that the adaptation
of Justice Brennan's language in Bakke by the Sixth Circuit in
Young presents a more prevalent test: whether "there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial
and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities. 1 7 9 The similarity to Justice Brennan's
formula in Weber is easily detectable.
Finally, the ambivalence is reflected in the discussions of the
standard by which the employer's formulation of the plan is to be
reviewed. The cases have adopted a reasonableness test that is practically indistinguishable from the test employed in private sector
cases. In Young, the court asserted that to conform with Justice
Brennan's Bakke analysis. "the test of reasonableness requires a
showing that no other approach offers a practical means of achieving
the ends of the program in the foreseeable future."180 The court,
however, in its directions for remand did not discuss this requirement1 8 1 and focused instead on its reasonableness test and the Weber
factors:
The reasonableness test includes a determination whether

the affirmative action plan is "substantially related" to the
objectives of remediation of prior discrimination and improved
law enforcement. A racial preference plan is reasonable when it
provides an effective remedy for past discrimination without unnecessarily trammeling the interests of white candidates for
promotion ...
On remand, the district court must consider the factors
enumerated in Weber. It must consider the urgency of effectuating the state's objectives, practical limitations in doing so, and
176.

Local Union No. 35 v. City of Hartford, 625 F.2d 416 (2d. Cir. 1980); Detroit

Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979).
177. See supra note 168 and cases cited therein.
178. Local Union No. 35, 625 F.2d at 422.
179. 608 F.2d at 694.

180. Id.
181. This requirement has also been largely ignored by the lower courts within the Sixth
Circuit. See, e.g., Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Mich. 1978).

the degree of hardship to be borne by whites. However, concern
for the interests of white employees cannot be allowed to thwart
achievement of the state's goals. It is reasonable for some persons innocent of wrongdoing to bear some burden in order to
correct the harsh effects of a grievous wrong of constitutional
dimensions and enhance public safety by improved law
enforcement.
The district court should also consider that a goal which
seeks the same racial proportion among employees as in the labor force will ordinarily be reasonable."s
The court held that a showing of past intentional discrimination by
the city against individual blacks was not required.183
If a demonstration of chronic and substantial past discrimination exists even in the absence of legal liability, and the plan is reasonable in view of the standards imposed by the private employer
cases, the courts appear willing to assume that race-conscious remedies are the only practical means to redress past discrimination.
Thus, while the courts may purport to evaluate evidence of past discrimination more carefully, the equal protection clause has not resulted in significantly greater protection for public sector employees
harmed by affirmative action:
In addition to the existence of past discrimination, another substantial, if not compelling, justification for affirmative action in some
areas of the public sector is the need for minority integration in areas of employment like public safety and education. If the state has
a legitimate interest in a diverse student body, as Justice Powell suggested in Bakke," 4 then it has at least as extensive an interest in
promoting public cooperation with law enforcement authorities in
need of public assistance to perform their function adequately.1 85
Moreover, there seems to be a greater public interest in providing
black teachers for a school with a significant percentage of minority
students who are likely to drop out and need education-valuing role
models. At least in these areas of the public sector, courts should
sustain a "compelling state interest" if the public body carefully documents the need for remedial measures and those measures are narrowly drawn to constitute a reasonable response.
The lower courts' response to the public sector problem seems
more understandable when one examines the analytical tools provided by the Supreme Court. In University of California Regents v.
182.
183.

608 F.2d at 696.
Id. at 694.

184.

438 U.S. at 311-12.

185. In some situations, lower courts have found that a lack of black policemen resulted
in discriminatory treatment of black citizens. See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d

878 (6th Cir. 1983), modified, 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983).

Bakke," the Court considered equal protection and Title VI challenges to a special admissions program at the University of California at Davis Medical School, which had reserved sixteen places for
minority students . 87 A majority of the Court would have permitted
race-conscious admission decisions but struck down the Davis program.' 88 Justice Stevens, writing for four members of the Court,
found that Bakke was illegally "excluded" because of his race within
the meaning of Title VI and did not comment on the constitutional
question.' 8 9 The other five Justices, however, addressed the constitutional issue. Justice Brennan, writing for four members of the Court,
viewed the statutory and constitutional questions as the same. He
would have upheld the special admission program as a proper response to past discrimination, employing a middle-tier analysis. 90
Justice Powell, exercising the swing vote, applied strict scrutiny and
would accept the race-conscious programs only if there had been
past findings of discrimination by the institution in question made by
" ' Justice Powell found
a legislative, judicial, or administrative body.19
a compelling state interest2 in the first amendment-protected value of
9
a diverse student body.
Two years later, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,"3s the Court faced a

challenge to a requirement that ten percent of the federal funds expended for local public works projects be used to purchase services
or supplies from identified minority groups. The provision originated
in an amendment proposed in the House of Representatives, and the
sparse debates on the bill contained no explicit reference to past discrimination in the construction industry. 94 Justice Burger's lead
opinion, which two other Justices joined, found abundant historical
bases from which Congress could conclude that traditional procurement practices would perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.'9
With respect to the requirement favoring minorities, Justice Burger
stated that Congress need not act in a wholly color-blind fashion,'
and "when effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to
cure the effects of prior discrimination, such 'a sharing of the bur186.

438 U.S. 265 (1978).

187.

Id. at 279.

188. Id. at 325 (Opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 409 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. Id. at 328 (Opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
191. Id. at 307-08.
192. Id. at 311-12.
193. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
194. Id. at 458-59.
195. Id. at 478.
196. Id. at 482.

den' by innocent parties is not impermissible." 19 He did not articulate what he would deem an appropriate standard of analysis, but
observed that the provision "would survive judicial scrutiny under
either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke opinions. '"198
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Powell purported to
apply his Bakke analysis.199 He concluded that Congress' competence to make findings was unassailable20" and that the legislative
method of fact-finding is different from judicial fact-finding: Congress, whose role is representative rather than adjudicatory, need not
make specific findings with respect to each legislative action because
it has acquired expertise from continuing experience with the same
subject.201 The legislative choice of remedy should be upheld, therefore, "if the means selected are equitable and reasonably necessary
to the redress of identifiable discrimination. '02
Justice Marshall concurred on the basis of Justice Brennan's
middle-level scrutiny opinion in Bakke.0 Justices Stewart and Renquist dissented, asserting that a color-blind standard of awarding
service and supply contracts must be applied. 4 Justice Stevens dissented, not because of any absolute prohibition against race-based
classifications, but because of the inadequate procedural character of
the decision-making process used in the adoption of the set-aside
requirement. 05
In Fullilove, seven members of the Court were willing to uphold
race-conscious congressional action, given the appropriate circumstances, in the face of an equal protection challenge. To some extent,
however, Fullilove seems to be based on the panoply of congressional
powers, particularly the commerce clause power, the power under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to "enforce by appropriate
legislation" the equal protection guarantees, and the spending power.
To the extent the decision relies on these powers, particularly section
5, the applicability of Fullilove to state and local governments is
problematical. Despite Congress' particular competence in dealing
with the discrimination problem, due to its relevant powers, several
factors indicate that a competent state agency should be able to engage in affirmative action in the employment context.
197.

Id. at 484.

198. Id. at 492.
199. Id. at 496 (Powell, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 522-23 (Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
205. Id. at 550-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Whenever Congress creates a classification
that would be subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. . .judicial review
should include a consideration of the procedural character of the decision making process." Id.
at 550-51.

The Supreme Court previously has cited Congress' power under
the commerce clause and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
while rejecting challenges to Title VII's public sector coverage.206
While amending Title VII in 1972 to extend coverage to public sector employees, Congress was aware of Griggs and the disparate impact doctrine. More importantly, Congress rejected an amendment
that would have precluded federal pressure by means of executive
orders to hire a proportional number of minorities. 0 Congress has,
by exercising the powers at issue in Fullilove, explicitly required affirmative action by, public sector employees in some cases and implicitly endorsed the action in others.2 0 8 Thus, Congress has provided a
major impetus toward affirmative action in the public sector.
In a situation quite analogous to public sector affirmative action,
the Court upheld a state plan that consciously favored blacks. In
United Jewish Organization v. Carey,2 09 New York had adopted a
redistricting plan to create "substantial non-white majorities" in four
assembly and senate districts.2 10 The state enacted the plan under
pressure from the United States Attorney General under the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.211 This legislation had been upheld earlier as a
valid exercise of congressional power under section 2 of the fifteenth
amendment and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Justice
White sustained the redistricting plan, rejecting the petitioner's fourteenth and fifteenth amendment challenge. 213 At the outset, Justice
White pointed out that the state had done no more than the Attor206. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
207. Senators Ervin and Allen proposed an amendment to the Equal Employment Act of
1972 which would have provided as follows: "No department, agency, or office of the United
States shall require any employer to practice discrimination in reverse by employing persons of
a particular race. . .in either fixed or variable numbers, proportions, percentages, quotas, goals
or ranges." Amendment no. 829 to S. 2515, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. 1661
(1972). Senator Ervin was particularly concerned about OFCC requirements that building
contractors "practice discrimination in favor of the members of one race and against members

of other races"; he also wanted to require the EEOC to "obey the acts of Congress according
to the plain intent of Congress." His amendment would have allowed an aggrieved employer or
employee to enjoin reverse discrimination. The amendment was soundly defeated. Id. at 1676.
208. In addition to the public works program discussed in Fulilove, see, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 793 (1976), requiring affirmative efforts to hire handicapped persons. The Griggs decision
and tacit approval of the executive orders on affirmative action have created tremendous pressure on employers, as have the numerous nondiscrimination requirements in federal statutes
and regulations. See supra notes 8, 35 & 38.
209. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
210. Id. at 151-52.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
212. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
213. 430 U.S. at 162. Justice White wrote for four of the eight participating Justices.
Justice Brennan concurred in the result; his rationale was broader than Justice White's and
depended only in part on section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Justice Marshall, who did
not participate, would probably have joined Justice Brennan's concurrence. Thus, six members
of the Court appear to support the authors' analysis. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell,
concurred because the plan had neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against
whites.

ney General was authorized to require under the Voting Rights
Act. 4 Justice White also sustained the redistricting "whether or not
the plan was authorized [by] the Voting Rights Act." 1 6 Although
Justice White did not specifically rely on section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment as supporting the state's conduct, he rejected the argument that the state cannot act to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination when that discrimination is regularly practiced at
the voting polls. 216 The redistricting plan was permissible as long as
racial or political groups would not be "fenced out of the political
process and their voting strength invidiously minimized. 2 17
In Carey, a state legislature, not an employer, acted preferentially toward minorities. Otherwise, the case is very similar to the
use of affirmative action to ensure adequate minority employment in
the public sector. During the second reconstruction, Congress identified almost contemporaneously that both voting and employment discrimination are barriers to fulfillment of the promises of political and
economic freedom made to blacks during the first reconstruction.
Certainly, federalist policy would indicate that considerable deference must be extended to state governments that act responsibly to
fashion a reasonable remedy to cure the wrong that Congress has
acted to correct pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
If the Court were willing, as Justice Stevens so effectively stressed in
his Fullilove dissent, to look the other way and ignore the shoddy
process by which the minority set-aside became part of the Public
Works Act,"' it would be inappropriate to deny a state the right to
engage in affirmative action if a competent state body has carefully
considered and implemented a plan to remedy past discrimination.
Justice White's deference to state action in Carey is particularly
appropriate in the Title VII context 219 for several reasons. First, as
214.
215.

Id. at 162-63.
Id. at 165. This additional and "independent" reason was not supported by a ma-

jority of the Court.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 167.
Id. (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973)).
448 U.S. at 549-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

219. Certainly Congress has broad power to remedy past societal discrimination under
section 5, but the exact scope of that power has not been defined. Although opponents of
affirmative action conveniently forget the early history of the fourteenth amendment, Congress, contemporaneously passing the Civil War amendments, passed legislation favoring
blacks to compensate for past discrimination. See, e.g., Jones, Reverse Discriminationin Employment: Judicial Treatment of Affirmative Action Programs in the United States, 25 How.

L.J. 217 (1982). The cases under section 5 indicate that Congress can act not only to prohibit
the practices enjoined by the first four clauses of the fourteenth amendment, but also to remedy past discrimination or prophylactically to guard against encroachment of guaranteed
rights even though the conduct is not itself unconstitutional. L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 264 (1978). Furthermore, as Justice Burger has recently implied in Fullilove,
Congress need not have explicitly relied on section 5 for a court to sustain remedial legislation
as appropriate under section 5. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-77 (1980).
It is tempting to argue that Congress, by sharing responsibility for civil rights enforce-

Weber has indicated, Congress clearly sought to encourage conciliation and voluntary resolution of employment discrimination disputes.
Also, if a state or local government has established an agency with
an effective anti-discrimination mandate, Congress requires that the
EEOC first defer discrimination complaints filed with it to the state
agency before initiating its own investigation of the charge.2 0 Additionally, the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which extended coverage to state and local government, provide that the EEOC "shall
accord substantial weight" to a state agency's findings of reasonable
cause in discrimination cases. 2 '
Because Congress, aware of the problems faced by the states in
meeting their Title VII obligations, expressed a strong preference for

informal action and local enforcement, the local public body that engages in responsible affirmative action acts precisely as Congress has
directed. If the local agencies fail to act, then an action brought by

the United States Attorney General can be justifiably anticipated, as
was demonstrated in Carey. In light of the enforcement arrangement
envisioned by Congress, its preference for settling discrimination
problems at the state and local level, the deference due local determinations, the emphasis on voluntary enforcement, and the pressure
on public sector employees to engage in affirmative action, the courts
should avoid striking down state affirmative action plans which do
not clearly violate section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court's approval in Carey of benign race-conscious preferences should extend to other governmental agencies under circumstances which ensure that careful treatment of the sensitive racial
preference question has been undertaken and that qualified minority
persons have been hired as a result.22 2
meqt with the states and placing significant demands upon them, has intended to share with
them its peculiar competence under section 5 to deal with the problem of racial discrimination.
While this theory would strengthen the argument that the type of deference accorded Congress
in Fullilove should be extended to the states as well, Congress' powers under section 5 may be
nondelegable. Further, the cases have typically concerned Congress' ability to restrict states'
powers in matters like voting and employment and have not involved the extent to which Congress might enable states to do something which might otherwise offend the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.14. Thus, the text develops a
more modest approach to what the states may do under Fullulove, Carey and section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment.
220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976). The Commission must investigate the charge and
determine whether reasonable cause to believe the charge is true exists. If so, the Commission
must endeavor informally to eliminate the allegedly unlawful practice.
222. Much of the opposition to affirmative action rests on the feeling that affirmative
action results in hiring substantially less qualified personnel. Judge Newman's decision in
Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), illustrates the myth of
test-scoring infallibility. Judge Newman pointed out that quite crude measures are used to
make fine distinctions that are statistically insignificant and well beyond the reach of the crude
measurement.
The meritocratic appeal loses much of its legitimacy once the relatively crude nature of
testing as actually practiced is understood. The person who thinks the typical testing process is

Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have articulated safeguards which, if combined, would adequately ensure that public sector affirmative action could be undertaken only after extremely careful study and for important reasons. Justices Powell and Stevens
have suggested sensible safeguards for the use of affirmative action
in public sector employment. Under Justice Powell's opinions in
Bakke and Fullilove, a legislative determination is necessary at least
to ensure the study and debate of an affirmative action proposal coupled with a presumed expertise based on probable earlier exposure to
the subject matter. This goal could also be achieved through decision-making by an agency like a civil service commission, a human
rights agency, or a police or fire commission that has the resources
and expertise to adequately study the problem. Such decisions should
be sustained only if made by responsible policy-making bodies that
are familiar with the problems involved, hold hearings or independently conduct research into relevant matters not adequately raised
at hearings, consider the comments on all affected groups, and draw
conclusions on the need for remedial action. 22 As Justice Stevens
has cautioned, governmental affirmative action is a serious matter.
The procedure utilized is important not only because a fair outcome
is sought as in the private sector, but also because the government'
should only depart from Congress' anti-discrimination mandate in
exceptional cases.
It might be appropriate to apply Justice Brennan's requirement
in Weber that an affirmative action plan must have been implemented in response to a "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories"'2 4 to public employers. This requirement, or at least a requirement that the employer present significant
evidence of past discrimination, would ensure that the public body
would not act routinely to favor minorities. Moreover, the perception
of fairness to all citizens and the consequent legitimacy of state actruly meritocratic has ignored testing concepts of reliability, validity, and statistical significance. Furthermore, there are numerous important factors which cannot be incorporated into a
paper and pencil test. These unquantified factors may be more predictive of effective job performance than small test score differences. This is particularly true in light of the well-documented fact that blacks and other minorities fail to perform as well on standard tests which
typically reflect white upper-middle class culture.
223. It seem unusual from an examination of the post-Weber public sector cases that
there will not be a "finding" of discrimination by an agency concerned with employment
rights, like a county civil service commission, Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 26 Cal. 3d 257, 604
P.2d 1365, 161 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1980), or the Office of Civil Rights, Valentine v. Smith, 654
F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981). Often a court is involved, either as a result of findings made in an
earlier case brought by a protected minority, or through a consent decree reached short of trial
in which the court implicitly makes a finding of prior discrimination. See. e.g., Detroit Police
Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981). The
public body often can refer to notorious discrimination per Weber and Fullilove, which obviate
the need for a careful "finding."
224. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.

tion, particularly in such a highly controversial area as affirmative
action, are greatly related to the thoroughness of the fact finding
process and the soundness of the basis for the decision to institute
affirmative action. Even the most liberal bloc of the Court concedes
the need for more than minimal scrutiny in reviewing affirmative action plans because of the inherent danger of misuse of racial preferences in hiring decisions. Finally, the requirements that the courts,
since Weber, have imposed on an employer who would defend a reverse discrimination charge by asserting that it acted pursuant to an
affirmative action plan provide significant protection in conjunction
with what may be termed the structural and procedural due process
theories of Justices Powell and Stevens.
An open-minded and honest effort by the courts to address past
discrimination and to increase the number of minorities in public
employment should replace manipulation of the level of scrutiny
used to review constitutional challenges to state action. The problem
of applying the fourteenth amendment to public employment is similar to the difficulty of eradicating the legacy of race discrimination:
neither will disappear by ignoring the problem. While no one is enthusiastic about having to resort to affirmative action, it is a reality
of the 1980s and courts should act to ensure that it is carefully undertaken in the public sphere.
3. Seniority Overrides in Layoffs.-Another, and possibly the
most dramatic, impact of the Weber case is in the area of seniority
and its antithesis, "seniority overiide." Ordinarily employees are laid
off, subject to the employer's need for particular skills, in reverse
order of seniority. The effect of seniority-based layoffs on recent affirmative action gains is potentially great because a larger percentage of minorities will have been hired most recently. If the employer
releases employees based on seniority, the gains made by minorities
hired during the past several years as a result of less discriminatory
policies and affirmative action may largely disappear.
This dramatic conflict between equal employment achieved
through voluntary affirmative action and the role of seniority in the
collective bargaining sphere has arisen in several contexts. In some
cases the union has acceded, often after strong initial opposition, to
the modification of a collective bargaining agreement to provide for
proportional layoffs. 22 in more difficult situations, the seniority override conflicts with either a state statute or the collective bargaining
agreement, and the union has opposed the override 2 6 The resolution
225. See, e.g., Tangren v. Wackenhut Serv., Inc., 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979),
ajfd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981).
226. See, e.g., Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.

of these latter cases demonstrates the courts' willingness to endorse
affirmative action even when confronted with the congressional de-

sire to protect rights established by a bona fide seniority system.
Before discussion of the override cases, however, a review of the role
of seniority systems in the Title VII firmament is necessary.
During the lengthy Senate debate on Title VII, there was considerable concern that Title VII would upset the rights of incumbent

white employees. The bi-partisan managers of the bill, Senators
Clark and Case, made considerable efforts to allay this criticism in,
inter alia, an Interpretative Memorandum, which provided as
follows:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority
rights. Its effect is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for
example, if a business has been discriminating in the past and as
a result has an all-white working force, when the title comes into
effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill future
vacancies on a non-discriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged - or indeed, permitted - to fire whites in order to hire
Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.2 "
This interpretation of the last hired, first fired doctrine was later
reiterated by Senator Clark in response to written questions by Senator Dirksen, the cosponsor of the compromise and subsequent

amendments that led to passage of Title VII.228 Additionally, a
memorandum prepared by the Justice Department and presented by
Senator Clark similarly interpreted the effect of Title VII on layoffs
made pursuant to a system of reverse order of seniority.2 "
granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983); NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965 (Ist Cir. 1982), vacated,
103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983).

227.

110
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7213 (1964).

228. Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions, when
that management function is governed by a labor contract calling for promotions
on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, labor contracts call for
"last hired, first fired." If the last hired are Negroes, is the employer discriminating if his contract requires that they be first fired and the remaining employees are white?
Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill. If under a "last
hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired," he can still
be "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as "last hired" and not
because of his race.
Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list because
of discrimination what happens to seniority?
Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer to
change existing seniority lists.
Id. at 7217.
229. Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it
takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the
event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision
would not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even in the

Several weeks later, the Mansfield-Dirksen amendment was
submitted as a replacement for its predecessor, which had drawn
considerable opposition in the Senate. 8 According to one authority,
the substitute was "intended to satisfy the more significant objections to the House version of [the bill], including particularly the
objections of Senator Dirksen .
"I Section 703(h) was part of
this substitute 2 2 and provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Title, it shall
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different. . .terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority. . .system. . .provided that
such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
233
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Section 703(h) was proposed seven weeks after the earlier cited
Senate discussion.2 ' However, the amendments later codified as subsections (g) and (h) "confirm and clarify" the interpretation given in
the earlier Senate debates, despite the time disparity. The further
assurances included in the Mansfield-Dirksen amendment were necessary to secure passage of Title VII after a long Senate struggle. 3
The first significant Supreme Court confrontation with section
703(h) occurred in Franks v. Bowman TransportationCompany.t 6
The Court held that section 703(h) did not preclude a grant of con-

structive seniority to identifiable victims of hiring discrimination, or,
those who could prove that the employer's earlier discriminatory
case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white
workers had more seniority than Negroes. Title VI1 is directed at discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It is perfectly clear that
when a worker is laid off or denied a chance for promotion because under established seniority rules he is low man on the totem pole he is not being discriminated against because of his race. Of course, if the seniority rule itself is discriminatory, it would be unlawful under Title VII. If a rule were to state that all
Negroes must be laid off before any white man, such a rule could not serve as
the basis for a discharge subsequent to the effective date of the title .... But, in
the ordinary case, assuming that seniority were built up over a period of time
during which Negroes were not hired, these rights would not be set aside by the
taking effect of Title VII .... Any differences in treatment based on established seniority rights would not be based on race and would not be forbidden by
the title.
Id. at 7202.
230. Vaas, supra note 6, at 445. This was followed by a second but virtually identical
substitute bill. Id.
231. Id. at 447.
232. Id. at 449. Technicaly, § 703(h) was amended during closure debate by the modified Tower amendment to include the testing provision. Id.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982).
234. Vaas, supra note 6, at 449.
235. "Senator Humphrey, one of the informal conferees, later stated during the debate
on the substitute that § 703(h) was not designed to alter the meaning of Title VII generally
but rather merely clarifies its present intent and effect." Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424

U.S. 747, 761 (1976).
236. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).

practices adversely affected them. " 7 Balancing the rights of the incumbent employees against those of the victims of discrimination,
the Court stated that, at least where incumbents would not be deprived of their seniority status, the identifiable victims should generally be awarded retroactive seniority. 8 Without this relief, "an individual. . .will never obtain his rightful place in the hierarchy of
seniority.''
With respect to the meaning of section 703(h), the Court noted:
[I]t is apparent that the thrust of the section is directed toward
defining what is and what is not an illegal discriminatory practice in instances in which the post-Act operation of a seniority
system is challenged as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act.240
Even though several of the plaintiffs were identifiable victims of past
discrimination, however, the Court stressed that none of the incumbent employees "should be deprived of the seniority status they have
earned."24
One year later, in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,'4 ' the Court was presented with attacks on seniority
systems that allegedly perpetuated the effects of past discrimination,
a problem seemingly anticipated by the language of Franks. The
Court reviewed the sparse legislative history and concluded that the
"purpose of [section] 703(h) was to make clear that routine application of bona fide seniority systems would not be unlawful under Title
VII."'" Thus, victims of pre-Act discrimination could not use Title
VII to challenge an otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system
"simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination. 24 4 To
prevail, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the seniority
system was not bona fide.2' " The protection afforded seniority sys-

tems by Teamsters has recently been extended to seniority systems
adopted after the effective date of Title VII in American Tobacco
Co. v. Patterson.4
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 780.
Id. at 774-75.
Id. at 768-69.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 776.
431 U.S. 324 (1977).

243.
244.

Id. at 353.
Id. at 353-54. The Court recognized that its broad interpretation of

§ 703(h) pre-

vents the application of the disparate impact theory to a seniority system challenge. "Were it
not for § 703(h), the seniority system would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale." Id. at
349.

245.
246.
sters and
failure to

Id. at 353.
456 U.S. 63 (1982). The result was probably to be anticipated in light of Teama companion case, Evans v. United Airlines, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), which held that
make a timely charge of discrimination made the discriminatory act the equivalent

In attempting to define the scope of section 703(h), one can emphasize the language of Franks and Teamsters that seniority systems are not illegal unless they are the result of an intent to discriminate. That language seems to contravene the disparate impact
principle developed in Griggs by refusing to apply that principle to
the effects of seniority systems. The language also rejects the rule,
which had prevailed in the lower courts, that a seniority system
which perpetuates the effect of past discrimination is not within the
protective ambit of section 703(h). However, Congress intended
much broader protection of seniority systems, as indicated by the
legislative history. This interpretation is reinforced by the broader
statement of purpose in Teamsters, that routine application of a seniority system is not unlawful under Title VII. The broader interpretation is reinforced by other Supreme Court cases; in Patterson, for
example, the Court referred to the overriding importance of seniority
14
systems.'
In the leading case interpreting the scope of the employer's duty
under Title VII to accommodate an employee's religious needs,
24 8
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,'
the Supreme Court viewed seniority systems in a broader context than section 703(h) and held
that an employer need not abrogate a seniority system to accommodate an employee's needs.2 9 Also, the Court has very broadly defined the term "seniority system" in California Brewers' Association
v. Bryant.'10 The Bryant Court noted that the typical "seniority system" cited in the congressional debates provided that the "last
hired" employees would be the "first fired. 251
Thus, by defining "seniority system" broadly and interpreting
section 703(h) expansively , the Court has recognized that seniority
systems play a very important role in national labor policy and, more
particularly, in the scheme of Title VII. Clearly, the application of a
seniority system, including a layoff provision, that is not intended to
of pre-Act discrimination. Justice White observed that there was no apparent congressional
intent to distinguish pre-Act from post-Act systems.
247. 456 U.S. at 75-76.
248. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
249. Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor
policy, and seniority provisions are universally included in these contracts. Without a clear and express indication from Congress, we cannot agree with Hardison that an agreed upon seniority system must give way when necessary to accommodate religious observances.
id. at 79.
250. 444 U.S. 598 (1980). The Court noted the need for ancillary rules which may
themselves not be directly related to length of employment for a seniority system to operate.
"Rules that serve these necessary purposes do not fall outside § 703(h) simply because they do
not, in and of themselves, operate on the basis of some factor involving the passage of time."
Id. at 607-08.
251. Id. at 605 n.10.

discriminate is not a violation of Title VII. The more difficult question is whether section 703(h) should preclude employees and courts
from altering seniority system "last-hired, first-fired" provisions to
preserve affirmative action gains if the beneficiaries of affirmative action are not identifiable victims of discrimination.
In apparently the first reported post-Weber override case, Tangren v. Wackenhut Services, Inc., 52 the employer was under pressure from the Atomic Energy Commission to maintain minority representation in its work force pursuant to Executive Order 11,246.253
The employer agreed to negotiate a change in layoff provisions that
would maintain a minimum percentage of minority employees in
case of future work force reductions.2 5 " Although the union initially
resisted any modification of the current seniority system, a majority
of the employees ultimately approved the change.255 When the new
provision was challenged by white employees, the district court
found that the modification to protect minority persons hired pursuant to an affirmative action plan "mirrored the purposes of the statute"2 56 and did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of white
employees. '"257 The Tangren court recognized that its decision represented an extension of Weber, because the issue of pre-existing seniority rights were at issue, but nevertheless confidently decided for
the employer.258 In granting summary judgment for the defendants,
the court observed as follows:
The relatively minor infringement upon the seniority expectations of white employees is outweighed by the benefits to be
achieved by the affirmative action to insure minority representation in WSI's work force. Voluntary efforts to eliminate vestiges
252. 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979), affd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981).
253. 480 F. Supp. at 542.
254. Id.
255. Id. During negotiations, the employer insisted on the affirmative action provision.
The union resisted, and when the contract expired, the new layoff provision was one reason for
a strike by the employees. The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB
concerning the employer's unyielding position on the layoff proposal. No complaint was issued
by the NLRB. Because the union could not afford to continue to strike, a majority of the

employees reluctantly approved the change.
256. Id. at 546.
257. Id. at 548.
258. The statute does not say, nor did the Supreme Court hold in Teamsters,
that it shall be unlawful to alter voluntarily a seniority system that, while bona
fide. .

. ,

perpetuates past discriminatory employment practices. .

.

.As a spe-

cial exception to the general policy outlined in Griggs, the impact of § 703(h)
should be limited to the express language of the statute. It should not be read so
as to preclude the implementation of a program that goes beyond the requirements of Title VII . ...
Courts have long recognized that seniority rights are not vested. They are
subject to alteration at the adoption of each collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 548-49. The court cited Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co. for the proposition that seniority
rights are subject to alteration by a collective bargaining agreement. See infra note 262 and
accompanying text.

of past discrimination should be encouraged. Courts should intervene only when the means adopted for the accomplishment of

that goal are unreasonable. This is not such a case. " 9
6
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,1
1 the court rejected
a challenge brought under the equal protection clause and the civil
war era civil rights acts to a negotiated contract change providing
for increased job security for newly hired minority teachers. The
court applied a reasonableness test, similar to the Tangren inquiry,

which focused on "whether the affirmative action plan is 'substan-

tially related' to the objectives of remedying past discrimination and
correcting 'substantial' and 'chronic' underrepresentation. " 1' Because the changes in Tangren and Wygant were negotiated by authorized employee representatives, these cases apparently comport

with the language of Franks that endorses "the ability of the union
and the employer voluntarily to modify the seniority system to the

end of ameliorating the effects of past racial discrimination, a national policy objective of the 'highest priority.' "262 In light of the
broad interpretation of "voluntary" set forth in Weber, such results
can be anticipated. 2 5
A more difficult situation was presented in Southbridge Plastics
Division v. Rubberworkers Local 759.6 In Southbridge, the employer entered a conciliation agreement with the EEOC that provided for a system of layoffs contrary to the last-hired, first-fired provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The employer sought
259. Id. at 550.
260. 546 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
261. Id. at 1202. See also Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 732 (W.D.
Mich. 1980), in which the court employed a similar reasonableness test in a desegregation
case.
262. Franks, 424 U.S. at 779.
263. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Recall that Justice Brennan noted in
Franks that the seniority system is subject to modification if required by public policy. 424
U.S. at 778-79. If the union does not sufficiently represent the white employees, the remedy
should be a suit against the union for not fairly representing the employees. See Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967). However, a recent case found no breach of union duty in consenting to
an affirmative action program and for failure to process a grievance by a white who had unsuccessfully applied for a training assignment to which he might have been entitled but for the
affirmative action program.
It is doubtful that principles developed in cases of egregious discrimination
against blacks correctly define a union's duty when the allegation is that the
majority intentionally discriminated against or acted unfairly toward a member
of its own racial or sexual group through affirmative action. ...
Certainly the union was under no duty to try to obstruct the interests of
minorities, the persons aided by the railroad's affirmative action plan, and the
individuals the civil rights laws are intended most zealously to benefit and protect [citing Weber]. A stance hostile to the interests of women and minorities
might well have subjected the union to legal liability for discrimination of a
more traditional sort than that alleged by plaintiff, and the union, within its
discretion, was entitled to forego that course of conduct.
Parker v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 555 F. Supp. 1182, 1184-85 (D.D.C. 1983).
264. 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1977).

a declaratory judgment that the agreement overrode the seniority

provisions. The court held that seniority could be set aside only to
the extent necessary to comply with the law by affording relief to

identifiable victims of discrimination. This decision is consistent with
Franks and
represents what is now known as the "rightful place"
25
theory. "
Without either union agreement to alterations in last-hired,firstfired provisions or employer consent decrees mandating affirmative
action, minorities have generally been unsuccessful in their attempts
to enjoin the operation of seniority systems even when past discrimination has been alleged." 6 Under Teamsters and American Tobacco
Co., the seniority system-affirmative action conflict apparently requires a straightforward application of section 703(h), absent proof
of underlying discrimination.
In the first post-Teamsters cases in which the courts sacrificed
seniority system provisions in favor of people who had not been identified as victims of past discrimination, the courts modified consent
decrees that originally provided for affirmative action to override layoff-by-seniority provisions. 6 7 To assess the validity of this approach,
it is necessary to examine the nature of consent decrees and the rules
governing their modification. A consent decree is essentially an enforceable contractual agreement " subject to continual judicial policing.26 9 The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a consent
265. Id. at 916. The "rightful place" theory represents a middle ground between denying victims seniority benefits and bumping whites who were hired after the discrimination took
place. The question of the appropriate relief was considered by the Fifth Circuit in Papermakers, Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970) (emphasis in original):
The crux of the problem is how far the employer must go to undo the effects of past discrimination. A complete purge of the "but-for" effects of previous bias would require that Negroes displace white incumbents who hold jobs
that, but for discrimination, the Negroes' greater mill seniority would entitle
them to hold. Under this "freedom now" theory, allowing junior whites to continue in their jobs constitutes an act of discrimination.
Crown and Local 189 advance a "status quo" theory: the employer may
satisfy the requirements of the Act merely by ending explicit racial discrimination. Under that theory, whatever unfortunate effects there might be in future
bidding by Negroes luckless enough to have been hired before desegregation
would be considered merely as an incident of now extinguished discrimination.
A "rightful place" theory stands between a complete purge of "but-for"
effects [and] maintenance of the status quo. The Act should be construed to
prohibit the future awardingof vacant jobs on the basis of a seniority system
that "locks in" prior racial classification. White incumbent workers should not
be bumped out of their present positions by Negroes with greater plant seniority;
plant seniority should be asserted only with respect to new job openings. This
solution accords with the purpose and history of the legislation.
266. A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 26.20 (1982).
267. See supra note 226.
268. United States v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975).
269. United States v. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of United States., 643 F.2d 644, 648
(9th Cir. 1981).

decree in at least three instances. First, a decree may be modified to
comply with basic contract principles.7 Second, upon a showing
that the decree is void or no longer equitable, relief may be obtained
through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).2 1" Last, a court of
equity has continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree on the basis of
changed circumstances. 2
The nature of a consent decree has dual aspects: it is a contract
between parties, and it is also a judicial decree approved by the
court.2 78 Despite the typical laissez-faire attitude toward proposed
consent agreements submitted by the parties,"1 4 however, a court in
seniority override cases should decide whether the decree is a fair
and adequate resolution of the issues and is fair and reasonable to
nonminorities who may be affected by it.' 75 A court should also consider available alternatives and objections to the proposed decree
presented at a hearing.' 7 If a party has made a timely motion to
intervene and presents cogent objections, however, the intervenor
bears the burden of demonstrating the unreasonableness of the
77
proposal.'
Public policy favoring employers' voluntary compliance and the
use of affirmative action in alleviating discrimination weighs "heavily
on the side of approval of the consent decree.' 7 8 In addition to policy considerations, the court should consider the strength of the
plaintiff's claims on the merits, as well as the extent of completed
discovery, the stage of the proceedings, the want of collusion in the
settlement, and the experience of counsel who negotiated the settlement. 7 9 Absent a finding of abuse of discretion, the lower court's
approval, after a hearing, of the agreement will be upheld on appeal.' 80 But, if the trial court heard no evidence and had no greater
exposure to the evidence than the reviewing court, then the appellate
court will undertake a de novo review.' 81
270.
271.
272.

Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 559-60 (6th Cir. 1981).
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), (5).
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932). Modification of a

consent decree requires a hearing and findings of fact. United States v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 360
U.S. 19, 23 (1959).
273. United States v. I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236-37 (1975);
United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1334 (5th Cir. 1980).
274. See generally C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY
LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 845 (1980).

275. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1980); Vulcan
Society of Westchester County, Inc. v. White Plains Fire Dep't, 505 F. Supp. 955, 961
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
276. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir. 1980).
277. Id. at 1334.
278. Abt, Consent Decrees: Can They Withstand the Charge of Reverse Discrimination? 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 115, 123 (1979).
279. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1335.
280. Id. at 1334.
281. United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980).

These considerations prompted one judge in Brown v. Neeb,2 82 a
case based on sections 1981 and 1983,283 to affirm an injunction

against a layoff of Toledo firefighters based on the last-hired, firstfired method. Judge Keith attempted to distinguish an earlier Sixth
Circuit case, Youngblood v. Dalzell,284 in which the court refused to
enjoin minority layoffs from the Cincinnati fire department despite
specific goals in a consent decree. Neither the Toledo nor the Cincinnati consent decree mentioned layoffs. 285 The agreement in the Cincinnati case, however, contained a boilerplate denial of discrimination and thus was held to be significantly different from the Toledo
agreement. 286 Even if the language in both agreements had been
identical, Judge Keith noted, the factual circumstances surrounding
their formation were different, for there had been a judicial finding
of discrimination against certain policemen in the Toledo litigation.287 Furthermore, while the Youngblood decision did not address
the matter of the court's discretion to modify a judicial decree, 88 in
Brown v. Neeb the court specifically found that it could modify a
decree based on changed events if minority gains would have been
destroyed by seniority-based layoffs.2 89
Two concurring judges in Youngblood affirmed a preliminary
injunction that precluded "laying off in such a way that would reduce the proportion of minority persons in the fire department. 2 90
They agreed "that, even where a consent decree is entered, as here,
without a determination of liability, the court may later modify the
decree in light of changed circumstances to carry out the expressed
'
purpose of the decree." 291
The concurrence declined, however, to
override the seniority system provision and the Ohio statute requiring layoffs by seniority and interpreted the injunction much more
narrowly as follows:
Because the City is being required to pursue a course of action
that it has not, by the consent decree, contracted to follow, and
because liability has never been established, it seems to me that
the district court should take particular care to exercise judicial
282. 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981).
283. Even though the Supreme Court has held that §
remedy, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454
able to avoid the congressional desire to protect a bona fide
1981. See Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, 575 F.2d 471 (4th
supra note 87, at 486.
284. 568 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1978).
285. Id.
286. 644 F.2d at 561.
287. Id. at 562.

288.

Id. at 563.

289.
290.

Id. at 564.
Id. at 566 (Brown & Wiseman, JJ., concurring).

291.

Id. at 565.

1981 is a separate and distinct
(1975), plaintiffs should not be
seniority system by resort to §
Cir. 1978). See also SULLIVAN,

restraint in modifying the consent decree to overrule the decision
of the elected City officials and their appointees concerning the
proper way to meet this financial ciisis ....
Thus, the city may, under the injunction, refrain from laying off in the fire department and seek savings in other areas or
it may, if it chooses, lay off on a proportional basis and face
whatever legal consequences that may flow from such action. 92
One year later in Stotts v. Memphis Fire Department29" Judge
Keith, writing for a majority, relied heavily on his opinion in Brown
v. Neeb.2 " The Stotts decision approved the district court's modifications of a consent decree to suspend the last-hired, first-fired provision to retain minorities in the city's fire department. Both the city
and the union had urged that the modification impermissibly
awarded retroactive seniority to minorities in violation of Franks and
Teamsters, presumably because the beneficiaries were not identifiable victims of discrimination or because of the apparently immediate displacement effect on incumbents.29 5 Rather than explicitly confronting these arguments, Judge Keith advanced three theories
which "indicate that a consent decree can alter existing seniority
provisions over the objection of an adversely affected union." 2 69 In
the first proposal, the "settlement theory," Judge Keith relied on approval of consent decree relief awarding retroactive seniority upon
reinstatement to actual victims of a discriminatory policy.2 97 This
theory is obviously inadequate justification for allowing modification
of a consent decree to bump senior employees in favor of those who
are not identifiable victims of discrimination. Second, he reiterated
his Brown theory that the decree could be modified. 298 Finally, he
relied on an Eighth Circuit case, in which a black with greater seniority was retained in favor of a union steward allegedly protected
by a contract provision wholly unrelated to seniority, for a "derivative authority to temporarily override the provisions of the Union's
collective bargaining agreement." '9
The third municipal cutback case, which, like Stotts, was
brought under the early civil rights acts and Title VII, is Boston
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 565-66.
679 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 2451 (1983).
Id. at 560.
Id. at 564.

296.

Id.

297. Id.
298. Id. at 566.
299. Id. at 567. A white male steward was laid off when the employer had to reduce his
force from four to two. The Eighth Circuit upheld laying off the white steward despite an
agreement that the union steward was to be the last man laid off. The employer was motivated
by a desire to maintain compliance with the "St. Louis plan" under Exec. Order 11,246. Sisco
v. J.B. Alverici Constr. Co., 653 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1981).

Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher.800 Upon findings of discrimination, the
district court entered a consent decree providing for affirmative action.301 Subsequent budget-cutting layoffs pursuant to seniority
would have resulted in a layoff of fifty-five percent of the department's minority officers, an impact in conflict with the spirit if not
the letter of the consent decree. 80' Thus, despite a Massachusetts
statute mandating layoffs on a last-hired, first-fired basis, the district
court revised the decree to retain the levels of minorities specified in
the original decree. 80 3
The city, the union and nonminority employees subject to layoff
sought to block the modification by presenting three main arguments: first, a consent decree should not be subject to drastic modification; second, a controlling state statute mandated firing in reverse
order of seniority; and last, the employer was engaging in reverse
discrimination.304 With respect to the first argument, the First Circuit Court of Appeals cited Judge Keith's opinion in Brown v. Neeb
as controlling precedent and found the case analogous. 0 5 There had
been judicial findings of discrimination in both cases.3 0 6 Also, the
decrees in both cases contained language warranting a conclusion
that the agencies undertook affirmative duties to integrate the police
and fire departments until the percentage of blacks and Hispanics
approximated that of the general population. 0 7 Finally, neither contained the exculpatory language of the agreement in Youngblood.3 0 8
Therefore, the district court had the power to modify the consent
decrees in light of the occurrence of unforeseen conditions. 0 9
The Beecher court next considered whether section 703(h) and
the state statute precluded a modification of the decree to provide for
seniority override.3 10 The court cursorily examined three Supreme
Court seniority cases, Franks, Teamsters, and American Tobacco
Co., but failed to distinguish between beneficiaries of affirmative action who were not identified victims of discrimination and identified
victims for whom the Court explicitly sanctioned in Franks retroactive seniority under section 703(h). Thus, the Beecher court found
that the three cases did not "apply to the basic issue at stake here:
the power of a court in a litigated discrimination case to ensure that
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
286-93.
306.
307.

679 F.2d 965 (1st Cir. 1982), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 2076 (1983).
Id. at 973.
Id. at 970.
Id. at 975.
Id. at 966.
Id. at 972-73. See the discussion of Brown v. Neeb, supra text accompanying notes
Id. at 973.
Id.

308. Id.
309.
310.

Id.
Id. at 973-75.

relief already ordered not be eviscerated by seniority-based layoffs."' 1 The court in Beecher suspended the operation of the state
statute because it is "settled that remedies to right the wrong of past
,discrimination may suspend valid state laws." 312
With respect to the third argument, the Beecher court recognized that seniority override places a greater burden on whites than
affirmative action does in the hiring context.313 Nevertheless, the
court stated that limiting constructive seniority to identifiable victims
would not correct the racial imbalance. 14 The First Circuit ruled
that the effort to preserve the ratio of blacks at approximately onehalf their ratio in the general population met the test of "reasonableness."8 13 In addition, the effort also muted "antagonism, hostility,
and strife between the citizenry and those departments," by satisfying a compelling state interest.81 The court found Weber more useful in its analysis than Bakke and concluded that the set-aside could
not be fairly "characterized as unnecessarily trammeling the interest
of the whites. 81
The problem of preserving hard-fought minority gains in the
face of budgetary cutbacks and predictions for a slow economic
growth may prove to be the most difficult obstacle for affirmative
action.318 As opposed to Franks, where the Supreme Court stressed
that retroactive seniority is appropriate relief for past discrimination
to the extent that incumbent employees are not adversely affected,
the immediate effect of override relief will be to -bump more senior
white incumbents. Also, as opposed to the Weber dictates, the relief
drastically affects, if not unnecessarily trammels, the interests of
white employees. The affirmative action plan in Weber resulted in
the acceptance of less senior black employees into a training program while excluding more senior white employees. One possible ex311. Id. at 974-75. The court cited twoSecondCircuit Cases, Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980), and Ass'n Against Discrimination in Employment Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256 (2d Cir. 1981), which are of doubtful validity
after American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson. See supra note 246.
312. 679 F.2d at 975.
313. Id. at 976.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 977.
316. Id.
317. Id. The decision whether to preserve the gains ordered as a result of past discrimination or to uphold the seniority provision posed a hard choice for the court:
The layoffs here were bound to cause undeserved injury in any event. While
seniority was the normal way to decide who must go first, there is nothing magical about seniority, and here common sense suggests that it should be tempered
by other entirely rational considerations so that the racial equity achieved at
considerable effort in the past decade not be erased.
Id. at 978.
318. But note that Beecher was remanded for mootness after Massachusetts provided
revenue to rehire the laid-off firefighters. See supra note 300. Similarly the employees laid off
in Stotts have been rehired.

planation for the Court's willingness to disregard its prior concern
for seniority systems is that the program created new rights for all
employees. The affirmative action program did not interfere with existing rights or expectations of incumbents.
On the other hand, Justice Brennan did sweep aside Brian
Weber's argument that it was unfair to exclude him because neither
he nor the employer were implicated in the prior craft discrimination. Justice Brennan suggested that the Weber plan was acceptable
because it "[did] not require the discharge of white workers and
their replacement with new black hirees. 3 1 1 This statement indicates Justice Brennan's cognizance that the "freedom now" or "replacement" theory of relief had been rejected by other courts, even
after a judicial finding of discrimination against identifiable victims,
as extremely unfair to incumbents' expectations.3 0
Thus, it is difficult to understand how the First Circuit in
Beecher could have found solace in Justice Brennan's Weber opinion.
The effect of the modification is clearly to displace innocent incumbents, even though they are not displaced not in favor of new, but
merely newer, black hirees. Furthermore, the First Circuit's reliance
ignores the rationale of Weber that Congress wished to encourage
voluntary settlement of discrimination claims and that section
703(h) does not preclude such voluntary settlements.21 While the
initial consent decree might well qualify as voluntary, the modification over the strenuous objection of the employer can hardly be
brought within the Weber rationale.
The First Circuit's treatment of section 703(h) and its interpretation of significant case law also seems incorrect. As discussed earlier, Franks and Teamsters suggest that section 703(h) protects discrimination resulting from the operation of a seniority system unless
the seniority system was adopted for discriminatory reasons. 822 The
legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to protect seniority
system job security.323 It is arguable, however, that although the
Court in Franks dealt with identifiable victims of discrimination, its
language, as follows, is equally applicable to the Beecher situation, in
which there has been a finding of discrimination but no identifiable
victims.
Section 703(h) certainly does not expressly purport to qualify or
proscribe relief otherwise appropriate under the remedial provisions of Title VII, § 706(g)
319.

320.
siderations
321.
322.
323.

. .

. in circumstances where an ille-

443 U.S. at 208.

As noted earlier, Justice Brennan appeared to incorporate traditional equitable coninto his observations about the Weber plan.
443 U.S. at 206-07.
See supra notes 243-45.
See supra text accompanying notes 227-235.

gal discriminatory act or practice is found.
. . . There is no indication in the legislative materials that §

703(h) was intended to modify or restrict relief otherwise appropriate once an illegal discriminatory practice occurring after the
effective date of the Act is proved - as in the instant case, a
discriminatory refusal to hire.""'
With proportional layoffs, some whites with greater seniority
are displaced in favor of black employees who have legitimate expectations of continued employment. As a result of earlier court action,
however, the court has either initially ordered the affirmative action
relief after a full hearing or approved a consent decree after examining the record and considering the objections of interested parties.
At this point, the court has previously determined, in a contested
hearing, that at least a substantial basis existed for a finding of discrimination. That determination is reviewed by the court in deciding
whether to modify the decree to provide for seniority override.
Again, all interested persons can be heard. In this situation, the initial decree, based on a tacit acknowledgment of discrimination, has
created legitimate expectations of continued employment for the minority persons hired pursuant to the affirmative action plan. Thus,
the result of the seniority override is not to replace incumbents with
new employees, but to add an additional legitimate consideration to
the layoff formula for existing employees. As Franks indicates, the
seniority rights of incumbents is only one consideration in awarding
relief to identifiable victims of discrimination.
The argument for seniority modification would draw on principles developed in Griggs, Teamsters and Weber. These cases reflect
the realization that awarding jobs to individuals after a finding that
they were subject to discrimination will not alone accomplish the
purposes of Title VII. Courts have recognized that affirmative action
promotes voluntary employer compliance and equal opportunity; that
seniority rights are not absolute if discrimination in hiring has occurred; that white employees may have to bear some of the remedial
burden; and that nonidentifiable victims of discrimination may be
beneficiaries of a court decree after appropriate safeguards have
been applied. Many gains obtained by the application of these principles will be lost unless the courts balance the legitimate expectations of all incumbents in light of the remedial considerations and
goals of Title VII.
Regardless of how strongly one may sympathize with the desire
to preserve minority gains, however, the pro-override argument
should succumb to the preservation of a bona fide seniority system.
324.

Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758-62 (1976).

Teamsters clearly underscores the concern of the Franks decision
with identifiable victims of discrimination, and that even when there
are identifiable victims, equitable limits on rightful place relief apply. 2 5 Thus, the Franks Court refused to displace innocent employees to accommodate identifiable victims of discrimination. Also, with
the exception of recent consent decree cases, lower courts since
Teamsters have refused to override bona fide seniority provisions.
Recently, in Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,2 the Supreme Court
has recognized that the interests of innocent third parties also must
be considered. The Court considered whether an employer must offer
retroactive seniority, in addition to the offer of a job, to one who has
claimed discrimination in order to terminate liability for back pay.
The Court refused to "require innocent employees to carry such a
heavy burden." ' 7 It reiterated the "overriding importance" of seniority rights and disapproved a rule requiring a hasty surrender of
those rights.3 28 The Court was concerned that, if "layoffs occur while
the Title VII suit is pending, an employer may have to furlough an
innocent worker indefinitely while retaining a claimant who was
given retroactive seniority." This would constitute a "heavy burden"
inconsistent with "the large objectives of Title VII."' 2 9 In Ford Motor Co., the employee was an identifiable victim of discrimination.
Although the employer was willing to hire the arguable victim, there
had been no formal proof of discrimination. 3 0
This concern for innocent third parties has been a major restraint on the willingness of the lower courts to order quota relief
even after proof of discrimination. As a result, such relief has often
been limited to hiring situations. Furthermore, the Second Circuit
has limited the situations in which it is willing to grant hiring quota
relief to those in which the discrimination has been long-continued
and egregious in nature. 3 1 Other courts have demonstrated a similar
325. 431 U.S. at 372-74.
326. 458 U.S. 219 (1982).
327. Id. at 240.
328. Id. at 239-40.
329. Id. at 240.
330. The Supreme Court has focused on the individual in a series of cases during the
past several years which culminated in Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). There, Justice Brennan rejected the "bottom-line" defense to a discriminatory test. His language seems
to reinforce the conclusion reached in the text even though it was used to provide protection
for the minority plaintiffs. See also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 103 S.Ct. 2177
(1983), in which the Supreme Court affirmed an award of back pay to employees laid off
pursuant to an EEOC conciliation agreement but in violation of the seniority provisions of a
collective-bargaining contract.
331. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 940 (1981); United States v. City of Buffalo, 633 F.2d 643 (2d Cir. 1980).
"The most persuasive justification for quotas, despite their inevitable reverse discrimination, is
that they produce results even in situations of egregious past discrimination." P. SCHLEI & B.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DiSCRIMINATION LAW 1400 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as
SCHLEI & GROSSMAN].

reluctance to use quota relief in the hiring context.8 82 Additionally,
few courts have used such relief in reverse discrimination cases involving promotions because "there is almost always an identifiable
victim of the reverse discrimination who is usually a majority member with long service with the employer."'33 There is, in addition to
equitable factors, "the delicate constitutional balance that must be
struck between the elimination of discriminatory effects, which is
permissible, and the involvement of the court in unjustifiable reverse
' 4
racial discrimination, which is not."33
The favorable treatment of one group when that treatment
would adversely affect identifiable members of another group also
conflicts with the Title VII focus on individuals, which, despite
Griggs and its progeny, has been recaptured.3 3 ' The Beecher court's
casual disregard of Franks and the other Supreme Court cases addressing seniority systems was inappropriate - those cases and
Weber reflect a concern for balancing the interests of possible victims of discrimination with those of innocent beneficiaries of the discriminatory policies. The balance struck in Franks should be applied
to seniority override situations unless the consent decree theory justifies a different approach or unless the section 703(h) considerations
are inapplicable to cases brought under sections 1981 and 1983.
The consent decree modification theory begs the issue. In Brown
v. Neeb, Judge Keith was undoubtedly correct in his statement that
a court has the ability to modify a consent decree under three basic
approaches.3 3 He neglected to point out, however, that the court is
obligated to consider objections to the consent decree or its modification and that approval or modification is subject to statutory, constitutional, and equitable considerations. 3 " The recognition of a court's
power to modify a consent decree does not imply that normal restraints on the exercise of the court's remedial power do not apply in
this instance. The Sixth Circuit recently reasserted this principle
when it reversed the district court's modification of a consent decree
in Oliver v. Kalamazoo Board of Education.38
332. See, e.g., Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 981 (1979) (a quota remedy shall be used only in "limited and compelling circumstances"); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977); Ostapawicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
333. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 331, at 1403-04.
334.

Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 633 (2d Cir. 1974).

335. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
336. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
337. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d at 1333.
338. 706 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1983). The district court made a finding of intentional
discrimination in the Kalamazoo school system in 1971 but did not expressly address teacher
hiring. In 1980, cutbacks threatened to reduce the percentage of black teachers from 11.1% to
8.9%, and the district court reinterpreted its prior orders to require a 20% black teaching staff.

Simply because a case is brought under section 1981 as well as
Title VII does not justify disregarding section 703(h) considerations.
While apparently no court has explicitly considered the effect of section 703(h) on its remedial powers in a case brought under section
1981, it is clear that section 1981 does not invalidate a seniority system absent an intent to use the system to discriminate. 39 Furthermore, the courts must consider principles of equity in granting a
remedy under Title VII, section 1981, and section 1983. The courts,
as noted earlier, have been extremely reluctant to order intrusive
quota relief in cases brought under the early civil rights acts and
Title VII. These courts should not ignore the intent of Congress and
the thrust of the relief cases without a carefully reasoned justification for doing so. To the extent possible, the courts should construe
the statutes dealing with employment discrimination consistently
and, since Title VII represents the most recent and complete congressional statement, focus particularly on Title VII in developing a
coherent approach to remedying employment discrimination.
In light of Washington v. Davis,s40 in which the Supreme Court
held that proof of intentional discrimination is necessary in constitutional challenges to hiring decisions, and General Building Contractors Association v. Pennsylvania, 4 in which the Court declared that
proof of intentional discrimination is necessary in section 1981 cases,
challenges to hiring policies of public sector employers will increasingly be brought under Title VII. In Title VII lawsuits, the considerations mandated by section 703(h) cannot be as lightly ignored. It
must be remembered that the Neeb Beecher, and Stotts cases were
brought before Title VII became applicable to public employers and
thus before the Supreme Court tightened the requirements for a
finding of employment discrimination in lawsuits under sections 1981
and 1983.
Perhaps the courts have acted precipitously in cases like
Beecher and Stotts. The white incumbents laid off in those cases
The court of appeals distinguished Neeb, stating that there had been a good faith effort in
Kalamazoo to recruit minority personnel. "[T]o protect the strong expectations in these pervasive and important seniority rights, the remedy must be 'necessary,' not merely 'reasonable,' to
vindicate the constitutional rights of students." Id. at 763.
339. Some cases so held based on the necessity of construing the two statutes harmoniously to avoid destroying the effect of § 1981. See Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575
F.2d 471, 473-74 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 979 (1978); Pettaway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1191 n.37 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 115
(1979). But see Borden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1978).
The former cases seem confirmed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), in which the Court held that proof of
intentional discrimination is necessary under § 1981. Thus, the person challenging the operation of a seniority system under § 1981 cannot rely on the system's disparate impact alone to

render it invalid.
340.

426 U.S. 229 (1976).

341.

458 U.S. 375 (1982).

pursuant to override orders have been rehired.342 Perhaps most of the
public sector employees subject to layoff would be absorbed back
into the labor force within a reasonable amount of time. Also, there
are alternatives to seniority system override that should be considered. As the EEOC indicated in its statement "Layoffs and Equal
Employment Opportunity,

34 3

the employer should look to methods

of reducing labor costs other than layoffs whenever possible. Worksharing systems, typically through a reduced work week, have been
incorporated into many union contracts. 44 Increasingly, organized
labor is making wage and work rule concessions to promote job security. Also, certain modifications of seniority systems, like consolidating seniority lists from several plants controlled by one employer
or shifting from departmental to plant-wide seniority systems, are
examples of collective bargaining modifications that may soften the
impact of layoffs on minorities and women without resorting to race
or sex preference.3 45 Thus, in light of viable alternatives to seniority

override, the courts should not lightly disregard the interests of innocent nonminority individuals in continued employment.
V.

Conclusion

Courts have moved toward a single standard for assessing the
legality of voluntary affirmative action plans under Title VII, the
early civil rights acts, and the equal protection clause. While there is
a heightened scrutiny in public sector cases, the prevalent standard,
essentially a reasonableness standard, has resulted in disapproval of
affirmative action only if employers tried to move beyond proportional representation, failed to undertake a written affirmative action
plan, or failed to act pursuant to a reasonable plan. The showing of
discrimination necessary to justify resort to the plan can be either
societal discrimination, for which the employer would not be liable,
or a work force disparity, which might lead to employer liability. In
the latter case, the showing required is usually minimal, probably
because courts want to encourage voluntary affirmative action and
do not want to require employers to make damaging admissions.
Summary judgment is appropriate in reverse discrimination actions in which employers have adopted a carefully prepared, written
affirmative action plan. The presumption of discrimination is not applicable, and the written plan greatly narrows the motive question,
which has typically deterred courts from granting summary
342.
343.
344.
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Boston Globe, May 17, 1983, at 1.
45 Fed. Reg. 60832 (Sept. 12, 1980).
Id. at 60833. See also Note, Alternatives to Seniority Based Layoffs, 15 U. MICH.
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judgment.
Public employers face pressures for affirmative action that are
similar to or greater than those faced by private employers; these
pressures often are judicially imposed. Public sector affirmative action should be sustained in light of these pressures and the Supreme
Court's willingness to uphold racial preferences under circumstances
less compelling than when public employment,is involved. Both the
lower courts and the Supreme Court, especially through Justices
Powell and Stevens, have developed sufficient safeguards to ensure
that public sector affirmative action will not be lightly undertaken.
Finally, recent cases in which courts have overridden seniority
systems in favor of affirmative action interpret Title VII affirmative
action principles too broadly. Traditional equitable principles and
congressional concern for seniority systems suggest that such seniority overrides are not an intended result of the evolving principles of
affirmative action in employment.

